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FLORIDA'S LAKES: PROBLEMS IN A
WATER PARADISE*
FRANK E. MALONEY and SHELDON J. PLAGER**
In an area in which lawmakers have not always equated water
law with water facts, it is encouraging to discover that the lawyer
and the hydrologist are essentially in accord on the basic physical
characteristics that distinguish a natural lake2 or pond from a natural
watercourse. While lakes and watercourses are both bodies of water
occupying a bed or depression in the earth's surface, the courts
have contrasted the watercourse to the lake or pond on the basis
that the water in a watercourse has a current or continuous motion,
whereas in a lake or pond the water is substantially at rest.3 Al-
though roughly accurate as a descriptive characterization, this state-
ment is in fact somewhat of an oversimplification.
A lake is essentially a "closed" or self-contained system; its mode
*This is the third in a series of articles on Florida's water law. The first,
Florida's New Water Resources Law, appeared in 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 119 (1957);
the second, Florida's Streams-Water Rights in a Water Wonderland, may be
found in 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 294 (1957).
A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
The authors have benefited from a review of a treatment of this general sub-
ject in a review-draft manuscript prepared, largely by Cletus Howard, as part
of a study of water-rights law in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio that
is being conducted by the University of Wisconsin under a contract with the
United States Department of Agriculture.
"Frank E. Maloney, B.A. 1938, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1942, University
of Florida; Chairman, Water Law Subcommittee of The Florida Bar, 1956-60;
Counsel to the Florida Water Resources Study Commission, 1957; Dean and
Professor of Law, University of Florida.
Sheldon J. Plager, A.B. 1952, University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1958, Uni-
versity of Florida; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'See THOMAS, HYDROLOGY V. WATER ALLOrATxON IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES
9-10 (1956).
2The unqualified work lake as used in this section will mean a natural lake.
3Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); see 93 C.J.S., Waters §103 (1956).
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of origin and attained stage in its life history are reflected in the
type and quantity of accumulated organic deposits in the lake and
in the composition of the water itself. These factors in turn deter-
mine the types of fauna that the lake can maintain.4 Watercourses,
on the other hand, especially the larger streams and rivers, are "open"
systems; they derive their characteristics from their basic function
as conveyors of surplus water from land to sea.5
To a greater or lesser extent both the lawyer and the hydrologist
have recognized that there is a fundamental difference between a
watercourse and a lake or pond, and that this difference is mani-
fested largely by variance in the water movement. At the same time
the hydrologist, and more recently the lawyer, has recognized that
within the totality of waterflow in its natural stages - the hydrologic
cycle - there is a close and continuing relationship among the various
natural forms in which water appears. An effort will be made to
trace the extent to which the law of lakes and ponds has turned on
these differences, or has operated in the light of these relationships.
The general agreement on the characteristics that distinguish a
watercourse from a lake does not carry over to the problem of dis-
tinguishing a lake from a pond, a marsh, or a swamp. As to these
latter distinctions, no generally accepted standards seem to have been
developed. The difference between a lake and a pond, if there is
one, is one of size: "[Tlhe pond is larger than a puddle but smaller
than a lake." 6 A marsh would seem to be roughly equivalent to a
swamp, and the latter has been defined as wet, spongy, soft low
ground saturated with water but not usually covered by it.7 For
purposes of this article, the term lake will include all bodies of water
that might be categorized as either lakes or ponds; they will be
classed as navigable or non-navigable as the context requires.
PART I. NAVIGABILITY AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
When Florida became a territory of the United States she adopted
the common laws and thus placed herself in the stream of Anglo-
American water law. This came to include the concept that the state
holds title to land under navigable waters in trust for all the people,
4See 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 599, 600 (1953).
5See COKER, STREAMS, LAKES, PONDS 123 (1954).
6BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (4th ed. 1951).
7Campbell v. Walker, 137 Ore. 375, 380, 2 P.2d 912, 914 (1931).
SFLA. STAT. §2.01 (1959).
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and to a large extent public rights became equated with navigability.
But title to some of the land underlying Florida rivers and lakes,
including some navigable waters, was in private ownership tracing
to early Spanish land grants. These grants have been recognized both
by federal 9 and state10 governments, and they necessarily lead to
a variation from the common law as to the title to land under navi-
gable waters. Moreover, the Spanish civil law background of Florida
may make it appropriate to apply civil law doctrines as an aid to
the resolution of some of her more perplexing water problems. The
power to adopt civil law principles when more in harmony with
conditions in Florida was specifically provided for in several of
Florida's earlier constitutions,:" and it is still employed by the Florida
courts when appropriate.1 2 An analysis of the Spanish civil law
approach to the relationship among navigation, ownership of lake
beds, and public rights to make use of water will therefore be under-
taken. Since the major water law developments in Florida to date
have been based on common law principles, however, these concepts
will be examined first.
Early Common Law Developments
The English common law granted or denied private and public
rights in natural bodies of water on the basis of whether the water
was navigable or non-navigable; if non-navigable, the water as well
as the underlying bed would presumably pass into private owner-
ship in the same manner as any other real property; if navigable,
the underlying bed might nevertheless pass into private ownership,
but the water became impressed with rights accruing to the public
that were generally comparable in importance, and sometimes su-
perior, to those of the adjoining landowners."3
Throughout the development of these common law doctrines in
OSee U. S. Treaty with Spain, 8 STAT. 252 (1819); Mitchel v. United States, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); United States v. Mitchel, 40 U.S. (14 Pet.) 24 (1841).
'oSee Hardee v. Horton, 90 Fla. 452, 108 So. 189 (1925); Apalachicola Land
and Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923); State ex rel. Ellis
v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
"FLA. CONsT. of 1838, art. 16, §6; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. 15, §5; FLA. CONsT.
of 1865, art. 16, §6.
12E.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Willis v. Phillips, 147 Fla.
368, 2 So.2d 732 (1941); Dade County v. South Dade Farms, Inc., 133 Fla. 288,
182 So. 858 (1938).
13See Maloney & Plager, Florida's Streams, 10 U. FLA. L. Rav. 294-97 (1957).
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England - a land of many running streams and brooks but few
lakes of significance -there appears not to have been an early de-
termination of the applicability of these principles to lakes.14 Much
of the common law governing rights and interests in natural bodies
of water found its origin in the watercourse, whether river, stream,
or brook. Those American jurisdictions that have followed the com-
mon law applied the existing precedents, with local modifications, to
their own watercourses; and as the doctrines seemed largely appli-
cable, and perhaps because there was no better authority to follow,
they generally applied the same rules to lakes. 15
As the English law first developed, the question of navigability
was one of law; and the early courts apparently based their de-
termination of navigability on the ebb and flow of the tide. Tidal
waters carried with them the incidents of ownership attributed to
navigable waters, while waters not affected by the tides did not.' 6
American courts adopted the English concept of navigability but
redefined the criteria. Navigability came to mean a factual determin-
ation of traversibility, regardless of tides, for general public pur-
poses -quite often stated as commercial purposes, since that was
the primary public interest at the time. The result was a tremendous
increase in the number and types of bodies of water in which public
rights were recognized.
As might have been anticipated, the courts of different jurisdic-
tions have developed varying definitions of navigability, and the
broadness or narrowness with which the term has been construed
has affected the extent to which public rights to make use of the
waters have been recognized and protected in these jurisdictions.
American Definitions of Navigability
Since federal jurisdiction over navigable waters under the com-
1
41n 1878 the English House of Lords, in Briston v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641,
construed these common law rules to be equally applicable to lakes and streams.
Because of the late date of the decision, it is not binding precedent in most Ameri-
can jurisdictions, e.g., FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 28, §1 (Smith-
Hurd 1959). Nevertheless it has generally been followed in this country; see, e.g.,
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 392 (1891); Turner v. Holland, 65 Mich. 453, 33
N.W. 283 (1887).
15E.g., Turner v. James Canal Co., 155 Cal. 82, 99 Pac. 520 (1909); State v.
Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914); Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac.
114 (1925).
'OMiddleton v. Pritchard, 4 Ill. 509, 38 Am. Dec. 112 (1842); Hooker v.
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merce clause of the United States Constitution reaches into the four
corners of the United States and casts an omnipresent shadow over
the definitions of navigability proposed by the various states, it
should properly be considered first. This test uses the criterion of
commercial utility of the body of water in question. Navigability
based on the ebb and flow of the tide has been replaced by naviga-
bility in fact; and "in fact" has usually been taken to mean suscep-
tible of use by commercial traffic.'17
Parenthetically, under federal law "a waterway, otherwise suitable
for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because
artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use before com-
mercial navigation may be undertaken."' 8 This has been termed the
"reasonable improvability" test.19 Florida by case precedent is not
in accord with this approach. The "natural state" of the water must
allow navigation. 20
In jurisdictions such as Florida, where the earliest public uses
included the movement of logs as a part of lumbering operations,
the factual test of navigability tended to become the "saw log test."
The courts asked whether the waterway was capable of floating a
saw log to market. 21 This capability did not need to exist throughout
all seasons of the year, so long as the water remained high enough
to make it usable as a highway for reasonable periods of time.22 The
saw log test was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court as early as
1889,23 and a similar test was applied to a lake in a 1909 case. In
finding the lake navigable even though it went dry for such long
Cummings, 20 Johns. R. 90, 11 Am. Dec. 249 (N.Y. 1822). See, however, Annot.,
23 A.L.R. 757 (1923).
i7E.g., United States v. Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Mo. 1947); People ex rel.
New York Cent. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 258 App. Div. 356, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812
(3d Dep't), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940); Asselin v. Blount, 65 R.I.
293, 14 A.2d 696 (1940).
'8United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
'OKneeland & Ritchie, Federal Power Act, 39 MicH. L. REv. 976, 993 (1941).
20See Lopez v. Smith, 109 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1959); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla.
109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
21E.g., Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926); Village of
Bloomer v. Town of Bloomer, 128 Wis. 297, 107 N.W. 974 (1906); Olson v.
Merrill, 42 Wis. 203 (1877).
2 2Logan v. Chas. K. Spaulding Logging Co., 100 Ore. 731, 190 Pac. 349 (1920);
Hallock v. Suitor, 37 Ore. 9, 60 Pac. 384 (1900); A. C. Conn Co. v. Little Suamico
Lumber Mfg. Co., 74 Wis. 652, 43 N.W. 660 (1889).
23Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 19, 6 So. 160, 161 (1889).
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periods of time that crops were planted and harvested on the bed,
the Court said: 24
"The products of the community at least in some consider-
able measure may be transported upon the waters if so desired,
and the waters are admittedly of considerable area and useful
for general navigation in small boats containing persons en-
gaged in pursuits either of business or pleasure. Whether the
lake has been used for commercial purposes or not is im-
material, if it may be made useful for any considerable navi-
gation or commercial intercourse between the people of a
large area. The fact that the lake goes dry is unimportant, if
in its ordinary state it is in fact navigable.- 2 5
Today's users of Florida's lakes are much more likely to be
small boat enthusiasts desiring to use the water for recreational pur-
poses than loggers "floating to market the products of the country. ' '26
Their right to make use of the waters, assuming that they are not
riparian owners, may depend on a finding of navigability. If the
water was once used for floating products to market, their right of use
will apparently be guaranteed. But suppose it cannot be shown that
the water is useful for commercial intercourse of this sort? If a state
must apply the measuring device of commercial utility to its waters
in order to conform to the federal test of navigability, recreational
access by the public may be severely limited.
Is the federal test controlling in state determination of naviga-
24Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 412, 50 So. 826, 831 (1909).
25This language indicates a tendency of the Florida Court to move toward a
test of current commercial potential rather than a test of commercial history, such
as was applied in a recent Minnesota case, State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89
N.W.2d 661 (1957), in its determination of navigability. The Minnesota court,
content to hang the crucial question of navigability on the whimsical wanderings
of transient fur trappers, applied the test of actual commercial use at the time
of the state's birth. The Florida dictum accords with the federal view expressed
in Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
932 (1950): "The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of navigability, rather than the extent
and manner of that use. . . . 'The evidence of the actual use of streams . . .
may be most persuasive, but . . . the susceptibility to use as a highway of com-
merce may still be satisfactorily proved.'" This holding negates the evidentiary
requirement of a prolonged probe into the past and puts the problem on a more
practical plane.
-6Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 19, 6 So. 160, 161 (1889).
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bility? Those jurisdictions that answer in the affirmative seem to
feel that they are precluded from independence as a result of a man-
date from the United States Supreme Court.27 Thus Minnesota has
recently reversed itself and overruled an 1893 case, Lamprey v. State,28
which had made the state one of the most forthright proponents of
a recreational use test of navigability. In two recent cases29 Minne-
sota held that the United States Supreme Court decisions30 left no
room for a separate state definition of navigability. Some courts,
however, disagree. They argue that the federal test is mandatory
only when the case is one that looks to the United States Constitu-
tion for settlement or involves a federal question.3 '
In a 1959 Mississippi case, Culley v. Pearl River Industrial
Comm'n,32 the Mississippi court was called upon to decide an issue
of navigability bearing upon whether the construction by a state
agency of a large dam on the Pearl River was in violation of a
state constitutional provision that navigable waterways were not to
be impeded. The court found the river to be non-navigable at the
site of the proposed dam, using a Mississippi statutory definition of
navigability which required that for a river to be navigable it must
be capable of floating a steamboat with a carrying capacity of 200
bales of cotton.33 The river may well have been navigable under
the federal "reasonable improvability test" set forth above.34 The
27United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
2852 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893); see Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757, 793 (1923).
2 State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957); State v. Bollenbach,
241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954).
30E.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283
US. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
3SIn United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 30 at 55, the Court said:
"Both courts below found that the lake was navigable. But they treated the
question of navigability as one of local law to be determined by applying the rule
adopted in Minnesota. We think they applied a wrong standard. Navigability,
when asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution of the United
States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be determined according to the
general rule recognized and applied in the federal courts." (Emphasis added.)
An earlier U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Chandler Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60 (1913), not clearly overruled, said: "The technical
title to the beds of navigable rivers of the United States is either in the States in
which the rivers are situated, or in the owners of the land bordering upon such
rivers. Whether in one or the other is a question of local law." (Emphasis added.)
32234 Miss. 788, 108 So.2d 390 (1959).
331d. at 811, 108 So.2d at 398.
34Kneeland & Ritchie, supra note 19.
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Supreme Court of Mississippi held, however, that "what 'navigable
waters' are is a question of local and not federal law, ' ' 35 and approved
the project. Apparently no appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and the federal government did not see fit to inter-
vene in the litigation.
If the Mississippi approach is a valid one, the federal test can be
effectively used by Florida as an initial screen to determine which
of its lakes are navigable in the federal sense. By the majority
view the states acquired these lakes and the soil under them from
the federal government impressed with a trust in favor of the
public; they are held by the state in its sovereign capacity and are
not subject to conveyance to private individuals. 3 6 The Florida
Court has long recognized the existence of such a trust, and has
applied the doctrine to lakes in a number of cases.3 7
But federally navigable lakes need not be looked upon as the
only navigable lakes. It is submitted that Florida, for state pur-
poses, has the capacity to classify a lake as navigable according to
a state test, even though it is deemed non-navigable by federal
standards. If this is conceded, an appropriate criterion for a state as
linked to recreation and outdoor endeavors as Florida might well
be one that recognizes a test of navigability based on recreational
utility rather than commercial use in the limited sense of transporta-
tion of goods by boat.
The United States Supreme Court has commented that suitability
for commercial navigability can be proved by personal or private use
of boats upon the water; 38 and Congress, in an amendment to the
Rivers and Harbors Act, amplified commerce as follows: 39
"As used in this section, the term 'commerce' shall include
35234 Miss. at 812, 108 So.2d at 398.
36E.g., State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d
709 (1948); lillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); Baker v.
Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W. 413 (1935).
37Adams v. Crews, 105 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1958); McDowell v. Trustees of Internal
Improv. Fund, 90 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1956); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So.
826 (1909).
3sUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (19,10).
3932 STAT. 372 (1902), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §541 (1958). In Luscher v.
Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 635, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936), the Oregon court similarly
stated: "A boat used for the transportation of pleasure seeking passengers is, in a
legal sense, as much engaged in commerce as is a vessel transporting a shipment
of lumber."
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the use of waterways by seasonal passenger craft, yachts, house-
boats, fishing boats, motor boats, and other similar water craft,
whether or not operated for hire."
A number of state courts have recently held lakes and streams
to be navigable when usable by small boats for recreational pur-
poses, 4 0 which one court stated to be "as sacred in the eye of law as
its navigability for any other purpose."41 Other jurisdictions have
extended the definition to include capacity for navigation for pleas-
ure and public convenience4 2 and a recent Ohio case details the
gradual evolution of the law of navigability to encompass recreational
uses.
4 3
The Florida Court has not as yet been called upon to decide
expressly whether its state test of navigability embraces navigation
for purely recreational purposes. The language of the Court in such
cases as Baker v. State,44 however, equating navigability with the
possibility of use "for purposes common or useful to the public,"45
along with the reference in Broward v. Mabry4r to usefulness "for
general navigation in .small boats . . . in pursuit either of business
or pleasure," may indicate a willingness to include recreational
boating in its test of navigability. The commercial and economic
value of tourism to Florida, because of her peculiar advantages of
climate, location, and environment, might influence the Court to
hold that, in Florida at least, pleasure boating is a commercial use
of the water. Moreover, a fish camp operator might be the provider
of the necessary commercial traffic, since the rental he charges for
the use of his craft could be found to furnish the requisite economic
interest.
Relationship Between Meandering and Navigability
Title to the land underlying most of Florida's lakes was at one
40E.g., Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957) (lake); State
ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 844 (1909) (river);
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952) (river).
41City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 97, 50 N.W. 661, 662 (1891).
42E.g., Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921) (lake); Hillebrand
v. Knapp, 655 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937) (lake).
43Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 (1955). See also 56
AM. JuR., Waters §181 (1947).
4487 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1956); accord, Lopez v. Smith, 109 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1959).
4587 So.2d at 498.
4658 Fla. 398, 412, 50 So. 826, 831 (1909).
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time held by the state; it was acquired from the United States in
one of two ways. If the lake was navigable in the federal sense when
Florida became a state, the state as sovereign acquired title to the
bed by the grant of statehood.4 7 Title to the beds of non-navigable
lakes remained in the United States along with the title to other
public lands in the state until Congress in 1850 enacted the Swamp
and Overflowed Lands Act.48 This act granted to the state her
swamp and overflowed lands, including the bottoms of those non-
navigable lakes not previously conveyed to private individuals by the
United States or the Spanish sovereign.
Immediately following the acquisition of Florida by the United
States, the federal government began to determine which lakes were
federally navigable and which were non-navigable. The factual de-
termination of navigability was placed in the hands of federally
employed surveyors, who were instructed to set aside navigable
water bottoms in the original federal surveys of the area. When the
surveyors determined that a lake was navigable, they meandered it-
in other words, they established a line, called a meander line, which
followed the sinuosities of the lake - instead of including it in their
rectilinear surveys. When it is realized that each surveyor was left
largely to his own discretion in deciding which lakes were navigable
and therefore had to be meandered, and that the process of meander-
ing in Florida was often an extremely difficult one because of the
generally swampy shorelines of Florida's lakes and the presence of
moccasins and other handicaps, it is understandable why no more
than 190 of Florida's lakes were in fact meandered in these early
surveys.49 Given more workable shorelines, it seems probable that
a considerably greater percentage of them might have been mean-
dered in the original surveys. In fact an 1855 "Manual of Instruc-
tions" issued by the Land Department called for the meandering of
"all lakes and deep ponds of the area of 25 acres and upwards."5 0
475 STAT. 742 (1845); United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 156 F.2d 769
(10th Cir. 1946), af'd, 331 U.S. 788 (1947); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50
So. 862 (1909); Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
489 STAT. 519 (1850).
49Landrum, Florida's Fresh Water Lakes, Civic Information Ser. No. 33 (U.
of Fla. Pub. Adm'n Clearing Serv. 1959).
5oSee dissenting opinion in Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 190
U.S. 452, 496 (1903). Similar instructions appeared in subsequent editions. The
stress placed on meandering all lakes and large ponds leads one to question the
fact that so few lakes were meandered. See MANUAL OF SURVEYING INsTRUcrIONS
(1902).
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An additional possible explanation for the paucity of meandered
lakes could be the fact that many of Florida's lakes have no navigable
water connection with the ocean and might therefore have been
considered usable for interstate commerce and hence not navigable
in a federal sense. However, the fact that a number of the lakes
that were meandered are landlocked leads to a discounting of this
analysis and raises the question whether they are in fact federally
navigable or whether they may not in reality have been acquired by
the state through the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act.51 Possible
misunderstandings on the part of the early surveyors concerning the
federal definition of navigability may also have played a part in pro-
ducing the seemingly inconsistent results.
How much weight will the courts attach to the fact that a lake
was or was not meandered when they are called upon to determine
whether it is navigable? The Florida Supreme Court has held that
the meandering of a stream on the original state surveys is evidence
of navigability, but that the final test is whether the watercourse is
navigable in fact.52 The same rule has been applied to lakes in Flor-
ida; as in the stream cases the Court has held that when a lake is
meandered the meanders are not necessarily the boundaries of public
ownership of the lake bed, so that "if a meandered arm of the lake
is not in fact navigable for useful public purposes, the public has no
right of access to that area."53 Nevertheless, the fact that a lake
was meandered is accepted as evidence of navigability and therefore
of public ownership. This makes such a lake available for public
recreation.54
On the other hand, failure to meander a lake has been held not
to be conclusive evidence that it is not navigable. Navigability in
5lThis question can perhaps be resolved in favor of the acquisition of the bot-
toms of such lakes as sovereignty lands by United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64
(1931), in which the Supreme Court found that certain portions of the Colorado
River, though not navigable in interstate or foreign commerce, were susceptible
of use as highways of commerce in Utah and hence were "navigable waters of the
State of Utah." The Court held that the land under these waters passed to the
state when it was admitted to the Union, along with the beds of these waters,
which were "navigable waters of the United States."
S2State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908); Bucki v. Cone,
25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
53Baker v. State, 87 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1956).
54The number of these lakes is not nearly so great as one might expect. The
writer of a recent feature article states: "Florida has long boasted of its 30,000
named fresh water lakes. Actually only 182 of these lakes are clearly and legally
in public ownership." All Florida Magazine, Dec. 7, 1958, p. 8.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
fact is again the test.55 This would seem to open up the possibility
that additional non-meandered lakes may be available for public
use. In fact, such a lake in Orange County was recently held to be
navigable, and a group of riparian owners were ordered to remove
certain fills that they had placed beyond the high-water mark.56 The
Court of Appeal for the Second District upheld the finding of navi-
gability.5
The effect of decisions of this sort is to upset conveyances of long
standing from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund as
violative of the sovereign trust. This may well lead the courts to
proceed with caution when there is doubt as to the navigability of
a lake the bottom of which was conveyed by the Trustees, on the
theory that the Trustees were dealing with swamp and overflowed
lands. Of course the establishment of navigability in this fashion
can proceed only on a lake-by-lake basis and over the vigorous op-
position of the apparent title holders of the bottoms.
These difficulties suggest the need for exploration of possible
means by which a public right of use of at least some of Florida's
lakes can be reconciled with private ownership of the lake bottoms.
Florida's Trust Doctrine
Original adoption of a different legal position vis a vis the "trust"
doctrine could have averted the reconciliation problem. A substantial
minority of American jurisdictions take the position that a state may
convey title to lands underlying navigable waters, subject to a public
right of navigation. 58 This view has the backing of able writers in
the field5 9 but a majority of the courts have adopted the "trust"
55State v. New, 280 Ill. 393, 117 N.E. 597 (1917).
56Crews v. Adams, 11 Cir. Fla., Apr. 16, 1959, per Pattishall, J.
57Adams v. Crews, 105 So.2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
58E.g., Turk v. Wilson's Heirs, 266 Ky. 78 (1936); California Co. v. Price, 225
La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1953); Hogue v. Glover, 302 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
591 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §53 (1904); Fraser, Title to the Soil
Under Public Waters - The Trust Theory, 2 MINN. L. REv. 429 (1918); Waite,
The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 542,
567-82; Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757, 765-73 (1923). Fraser takes the position that the
American courts erroneously overlooked the English common law distinction be-
tween fresh-water beds and tidal water beds, the former of which had been
so generally granted by the Crown that prima facie title to them was in the
riparian owners, while the latter were so seldom granted that prima facie the
Crown still retained title to them. American courts changed the rule as to tidal
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approach.60 Florida has aligned herself with the majority view and
has taken the position that the state holds title to the lands under
navigable waters in trust for the people.61 The Supreme Court has
stated that this trust cannot be wholly alienated. Title to limited por-
tions of the land under navigable waters may be granted to individuals
when this will result in improvements in the public interest, but
disposal of major portions of the bed of a navigable body of water
will be a violation of the trust.6 2
The doctrine was first applied in Florida in cases involving tidal
lands, a type of water bottom to which even the critics of the doc-
trine agree it is appropriately applied. But it was used in 1909 to
deny the power of the state to convey a part of the bed of a navi-
gable lake,63 and its application in a number of recent lake cases 64
consolidated the trust doctrine in this area of Florida law.
The minority view, allowing private ownership of navigable
lake bottoms but recognizing a public easement for purposes of
navigation, would have given more protection to public recreational
interests. Under either view, the title to small non-navigable lakes
waters from a presumption to a rule of substantive law, applicable either to tidal
or fresh waters. See Fraser, Title to Soil Under Public Waters, A Question of Fact,
2 M!NN. L. Rav. 313, 322-23, 326 (1918). The Supreme Court of Florida finds
further justification for adopting the trust theory, however, in its interpretation of
the Spanish civil law, under which such lands were held prior to the cession of
Florida to the United States in 1819. The Court finds that the Spanish law
apparently recognized that lands under navigable waters were held by the king as
"res communes" for public uses and that sale of these lands to individuals was
contrary to the general laws and customs of the realm, so that while grants could
be expressly authorized by the Crown, they would be strictly construed against the
grantee for the protection of the public. Apalachicola Land and Development Co.
v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923). See also Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325 (1859).
It is only fair to point out, however, that the references to Spanish law are made
in connection with rights in land under tidal waters rather than fresh waters.
Spanish law with respect to ownership and use of lakes will be discussed at a
later point in the text.
60E.g., State v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709 (1948);
Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); Baker v. Voss, 217 Wis.
416, 259 NAV. 413 (1935).
GHolland v. Ft. Pierce Fin. and Constr. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946);
Hicks v. State, 116 Fla. 603, 156 So. 603 (1934); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50
So. 826 (1909).
6zBroward v. Mabry, supra note 61, at 398, 50 So. at 829. Statutes authorizing
improvements in streams and in tidewater areas are based on this limited power.
63Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
64See note 37 supra.
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can be vested in private individuals; and these individuals will have
the right to control the lakes completely, with no rights reserved
to the public.65 There are many medium sized lakes, however, that
are more or less useful to the public but which, at least when the
state was relatively undeveloped, may not have appeared to have
sufficient public usefulness to warrant retaining title in the public.
In a jurisdiction following the rule that land under navigable waters
can be privately held, but that the right of the public to use the
waters for purposes connected with navigation is impliedly reserved
in conveyances by the state, a later determination of navigability
would not divest the private owners of any property interests. In such
a jurisdiction the right to public navigation can co-exist with private
ownership of the bottom.
Since the trust doctrine in Florida is neither constitutional nor
statutory in origin but is a product of the courts, 66 it is subject to
reinterpretation by them without doing violence to any legislative
pronouncements. Neither title nor incidents of ownership of the
beds of the waters would be infringed if the doctrine were to be ex-
tended to include a class of lakes navigable by state though not
federal standards, but with the trust applied to the waters and not
the bottom. Finding a trust of this sort could be the basis for
recognition of an easement for navigation without invalidating earlier
conveyances.
Such an easement approach has been adopted by the Supreme
Court of Oregon, 67 which held a lake one mile long and one-eighth
mile wide to be navigable in a state but not a federal sense. The
court found ownership of the bottom to be in a private grantee,
while at the same time stating that "the public has an easement for
purposes of navigation" in the lake. 6s The policy argument of the
65See 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §58a (1904).
66Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934); Deering v.
Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928); Broward v. Mabry, supra note 63; Adams
v. Crews, 105 So.2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
67Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936). For a similar approach
see Comment, Are We Losing Our Lakes?, 3 S.D.L. REV. 109 (1958).
68153 Ore. at 634-35, 56 P.2d at 1162. The court quoted with approval a four-
fold classification of water bodies from an earlier Oregon case: "'(I) Those in
which the tide ebbs and flows, which are technically denominated navigable, in
which class the sovereign is the owner of the soil constituting the bed of the
stream and all rights to it belong exclusively to the public. (2) Those which are
navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters. In these the public has an ease-
ment for the purposes of navigation and commerce, they being deemed public
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Oregon court is certainly applicable to Florida and is worth
quoting: 69
"There are hundreds of similar beautiful, small inland lakes
in this state well adapted for recreational purposes, but which
will never be used as highways of commerce in the ordinary ac-
ceptation of such terms. As stated in Lamprey v. State, ...
'To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under any
old or narrow, test of navigability, would be a great wrong
upon the public for all time, the extent of which cannot, per-
haps, be now even anticipated.' Regardless of the ownership of
the bed, the public has the paramount right to the use of the
waters of the lake for the purpose of transportation and
commerce."
Possible Statutory Extension of Navigability
In addition to the possibility of a judicial broadening of the
definition of navigability, Florida might make use of the legislative
process to define navigability to include use for boating for rec-
reation. In a number of early cases the Florida legislature did
attempt to create the presumption that various watercourses were
navigable.7 0 The apparent purpose of much of this legislation was
to create a presumption of navigability as a basis for memorializing
Congress to appropriate money for the improvement of navigation
highways for such purposes, although the title to the soil constituting their bed
remains in the adjacent owner, subject to the superior right of the public to use
the water for the purposes of transportation and trade. (3) The streams which are
so small and shallow that they are not navigable for any purpose, the public has
no right to whatever. (4) To this list may be added our larger rivers susceptible
of a great volume of commerce where the title to the bed of the stream remains
in the state for the benefit of the public."'
The court went on to say: "We think Blue Lake comes within the above second
classification where title to the bed is in the adjacent owners, subject however
to the superior right of the public to use the water for the purposes of commerce
and transportation."
60153 Ore. at 635, 56 P.2d at 1162. The court defines "commerce" as having
"a broad and comprehensive meaning. It isnot limited to navigation for pecuniary
profit. A boat used for the transportation of pleasure seeking passengers is, in a
legal sense, as much engaged in commerce as is a vessel transporting a shipment of
lumber."
70E.g., Fla. Laws 1872, ch. 1907 (Alaqua Creek); Fla. Laws 1860, ch. 1220
(Withlacoochee River); Fla. Laws 1849, ch. 291 (East River).
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in particular streams.7 1 No attempts to declare lakes navigable in
this fashion were located, nor has any across-the-board redefinition
of navigability been attempted. The Wisconsin legislature has
broadly defined the term,7 2 however, and this definition has been
commented on favorably by the Wisconsin court."3
But a statutory extension of navigability in Florida, without
more, might arguably result in invalidating earlier conveyances by
the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, and political reali-
ties indicate very little chance of its enactment.
There is another type of statute that might bring about a de-
sirable extension of public use while upholding existing conveyances.
In 1912 the legislature of the State of Louisiana enacted a statute
to the following effect:74
"[AIll suits or proceedings of the State of Louisiana . . . or
persons to vacate and annul any patent issued by the State of
Louisiana .... or any transfer of property by any sub-division
of the State, shall be brought only within six years of the
issuance of patent, provided, that suits to annul patents
previously issued shall be brought within six years from the
passage of this Act."
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has applied this statute to
purported alienations of the beds of navigable waters in two recent
cases, -5 the first of which involved a lake, and held that when the
conveyance had been in existence for more than the statutory period
the state was forever barred from attacking the validity of the
private titles. The cases have been criticized as doing violence to
traditional Louisiana concepts of title to the beds of navigable
7Memorial [No. 2] (1877) (Ocklawaha River); Memorial [No. 3] (1875)
(Withlacoochee River); Memorial [No. 4] (1870) (Holmes Creek).
72Wis. STAT. §30.01 (1955) says: "[AIll rivers and streams . . . whether
meandered or non meandered which are navigable in fact for any purpose what-
soever are hereby declared navigable . . . to the extent that no dam, bridge, or
other obstruction shall be made in or over the same .... "
73Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.V.2d 514 (1952).
74La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now LA. REv. STAT. §9:5661 (1950).
75Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d
839 (1953); California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954). See Lobean v.
Trustees of Internal Improv. Fund, 118 So.2d 226 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960), holding
the trustees legally estopped to question an invalid Murphy Act tax deed to
sovereignty land that they did have the power to convey under a then current
riparian act.
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bodies of water,7 6 and have resulted in legislation to limit the ap-
plication of the 1912 statute to lands previously considered sus-
ceptible of private ownership.7 7 But the earlier statute may point a
way to the solution of Florida's dilemma. A similar statute, if
given the same interpretation in Florida, might be used to prevent
attacks on titles to submerged lands previously conveyed by the
Trustees.
Such legislation, coupled with an extension of the state definition
of navigability to include recreational navigation plus legislative
recognition of the existence of an easement for public use of the
waters, would not be subject to the same criticism on policy grounds
as the Louisiana act. The basic purpose of the proposed Florida
legislation would be to extend recognition of public rights to bodies
of water in which they should always have been recognized, whereas
the Louisiana statute as interpreted resulted in stripping that state
of valuable mineral assets.
Any legislation recognizing private ownership of navigable lakes
should also confirm in detail the public rights reserved in the waters.
The Florida Court has often linked the law concerning public rights
in navigable waters other than the right of navigation to the theory
that the state holds title to the bed in trust for the public. This can
be seen in connection with fishing, wharfing, filling, use of shores,
and adjustment of lake levels, all discussed in Part II infra. Partial
legislation here might prove more detrimental to the public interest
than no legislation.
Legislation of a somewhat different character was enacted in
Florida in 1953. The legislature undertook to declare that navigable
waters in Florida shall not be held to extend to any "so-called"
waters lying over land conveyed to private individuals prior to that
time by the state or the United States. The same law further declared
that the submerged lands of any non-meandered lake "shall be
deemed subject to private ownership" when conveyed by the Trus-
tees of the Internal Improvement Fund prior to 1903 without reser-
vation for public use."" On its face this legislation creates a strong
presumption against the navigability of most of Florida's smaller
lakes. But the Supreme Court of Florida in McDowel v. Trustees of
Internal Improvement Fund79 took cognizance of the fact that the
76Notes: 15 LA. L. REv. 463 (1955); 14 LA. L. Rv. 267 (1953).
77LA. REv. STAT. §§9:1007-09 (Supp. 1954).
78FLA. STAT. §271.09 (2), (3) (1959).
7990 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1956). The Court further stated that if the re-enactment of
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legislation had been enacted as part of an act pertaining to tax
matters, and found that it was intended to provide a guide for tax
assessors rather than to make non-meandered lakes non-navigable
as a matter of law. The judicial invalidation of this attempt to de-
clare all non-meandered lakes non-navigable clears the way for legis-
lation that could reconcile private ownership of the beds of non-
meandered lakes with recognition of the right of the public to use the
waters for recreational purposes when they are navigable in a state
sense.
Additional Possibilities for Recognition of Public Rights
The Florida Legislature may have opened the way for access by
the public to non-meandered lakes without entering the semantic
morass surrounding the concept of navigability. A 1955 act de-
fining the water policy of the state declares:80
"The ownership, control of development and use of waters
for all beneficial purposes is within the jurisdiction of the state,
which in the exercise of its powers may establish measures to
effectuate the proper and comprehensive utilization and pro-
tection of the waters."
This policy led to the enactment of the 1957 Water Resources
Law.81 Lakes or ponds completely surrounded by land owned by a
single owner or by joint tenants are excluded from the operation of
the act- thus restricting its coverage to the type of inland lake to
which it would be advisable to extend a broader concept of public
rights. The Water Resources Law gives the State Board of Conser-
vation broad powers to promulgate rules and regulations to govern
the conservation and use of water resources within specially created
water development and conservation districts.82 These arguably
the statute in its new location in the chapter on grants to riparian owners were
made applicable in determining navigability for riparian purposes, it would in
its new location be limited in application "in view of §271.06 which renders the
entire chapter inapplicable to lakes except tidewater lakes." Id. at 717. The
McDowell case has since been cited as controlling authority in Adams v. Crews,
105 So.2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
S0Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29748, §1 (b).
8'FLA. STAT. §§373.071-.251 (1959).
82FLA. STAT. §373.171 (1959).
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may include regulations providing for public use of the water in lakes
in the districts. Compensation of riparian owners damaged by such
use would be required.8 3 The procedure would be cumbersome,
since it requires creation of special development and water conserva-
tion districts, but it might be resorted to if other methods of vali-
dating public rights did not prove feasible.
An alternative possibility might be legislation granting the public
the right to use non-meandered lakes above a certain size for recrea-
tional purposes, and at the same time recognizing the right of
riparians to recover damages which they could prove were actually
sustained as a result. The extent of potential recoveries under this
plan would probably, be small, and a fund for the payment of dam-
ages might be established by a small addition to the charge for
fishing or boating licenses sold in the counties involved. Such a
statute, however, would not in itself solve the access problem, since
it is extremely doubtful that the legislature could authorize tres-
passing over private riparian lands to reach the lake.84 Moreover,
the difficulty of defining and establishing recoverable damages, along
with the possible vulnerability of the statute to attack as involving
a legislative exercise of eminent domain in situations in which use
of that power could not be justified on the ground of public neces-
sity,'8 suggests that considerable further study will be necessary before
deciding as to the feasibility of this approach.
Another alternative might be to establish a dedication of an
easement for public use in certain non-meandered lakes. One pos-
sible basis for a judicial finding of a dedication would be the stocking
of fish in a lake by the state. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
recently held, however, that the fact that the state had stocked a
privately owned lake with fish since 1922 did not give the public a
83The Water Resources Law provides that present property rights of persons
owning land and exercising existing water rights appertaining thereto shall not
be restricted without due process of law or divested without payment of just
compensation. FLA. STAT. §373.101 (1959).
84A Colorado statute somewhat similar to the one proposed was declared
unconstitutional in so far as it authorized a trespass on the land of others, al-
though it provided for recovery of damages in an action in trespass for any prop-
erty damage done. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
srSee Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 31, 31 So.2d 483
(1947) (condemnation to create a public hunting and fishing reservation in a
remote area held not a public necessity). This eminent domain problem is dis-
cussed further in connection with the right of the public to access to navigable
lakes, pp. 56-58 infra.
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right to use the lake. s6 But a statutory presumption of dedication
when a lake has been used by the public and stocked at state expense
might fare better. The possibility of establishing such a dedication
has recently been recognized by the Minnesota court.8 7
A final possibility, which is currently under consideration in
Minnesota, is the granting of special tax treatment to riparians who
permit the public to gain access to the water over their riparian
lands. Such tax benefits might encourage riparians to grant access
when they ordinarily would refuse to do so.
Possible Use of Spanish Civil Law to Bolster Public Rights
The law of Spain approached the problem of the rights of the
public to make use of lakes and streams for boating in a different
way from the common law. Within Spain itself, the general public
had the right to navigate,, all rivers and lakes which were capable
of supporting navigation the year round, regardless of the owner-
ship of the river or lake.8 9
The Spanish law saw nothing inconsistent in the sovereign's con-
veying the bottom of a public river to private individuals, while
at the same time preserving the right of the public to traverse the
water.90 In fact, members of the public were free to moor their
86Camp Clearwater, Inc. v. Plock, 146 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1958). For a discussion
of the effect of a statutory declaration of state ownership of the fish see p. 72
infra.
slState v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 123, 63 N.W.2d 278, 291 (1954), in which
the court stated: "[I]t may well be that in the future a public right to hunt and
fish on some of the small inland lakes of this state can be grounded in a theory
of dedication ...." See 38 MINN. L. REV. 685, 689 (1954), for an argument that
such a statute would be constitutional.
8SThe term navegar, or navigate, as used in 18th century Spanish law meant
simply to make a trip on the water. The purpose of the travel was seemingly
immaterial, as was the type of boat. DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA CASTELLANA
(1734 ed.)
sgSee 3 DoMINIQUEZ, ILUSTRACION Y CONTINUACION A LA CURIA FILIPICA ch. 1,
§§86, 90, 131, 132 (1740).
903 DOMINIQUEZ, op. cit. supra note 89, §89. It is important to distinguish be-
tween land underlying tidal waters and ports, and the beds of rivers and lakes.
As to beds of tidal waters, the ribera del mar, and ports, conveyance to individuals
was contrary to the general laws and customs of the realm. Id. §§112, 115, 117
(ribera del mar), 120-22 (puerto); Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v.
McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923) (involving title to part of the ribera del
mar); Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325 (1859) (involving improvement of port). This
article concerns itself with the Spanish law with regard to ownership of the
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boats or vessels to privately owned shores, and landowners were for-
bidden to remove trees or posts customarily used by the public for
this purpose.9
In the case of public lakes, ownership was generally retained by
the sovereign or was vested in a community, or pueblo. In either
case, all members of the public, including strangers to the pueblo,
were entitled to use the lake for boating. If ownership was in a
pueblo, it had the right to control fishing in the lake.92
Lakes not continuously fed by running water were susceptible of
private ownership and could be conveyed in the same manner as
other types of private property; but if they had water the year
round they were subject to a servitude of navigation and the public
was entitled to use them for boating.93 If the water body dried up
completely during the dry season, it was not technically classified as
a lake, and no public rights of use inhered in it.94
It seems dear, then, that under general Spanish law it was not
thought inconsistent for the bottoms of certain lakes to be held in
private ownership while members of the public retained the right
to navigate in the waters. The laws of Spain were in force in the
Indies, including Florida, to the extent that laws local to the Indies
did not abrogate or modify them.9 5 In so far as the waters them-
selves were concerned, a royal proclamation of 1541 applicable to the
Indies provided that "all . ..waters in the provinces of the Indies,
[shall] be common to all the inhabitants thereof, present and to
come, and that they may freely enjoy the use of them . . . ."96 This
proclamation was apparently not thought to be inconsistent with
the conveyance of the bottoms of many Florida lakes to private in-
dividuals as a part of land grants from the sovereign.
Because of the civil law background of Florida, the Florida courts
might be willing to recognize these Spanish doctrines, along with
the declaration of the Spanish sovereign in favor of free use, as aids
in sustaining the recognition of public rights in public waters.
beds of rivers and lakes, not the puertos or the ribera del mar.
912 WHITE, A NEw COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS, AND LOCAL ORDINANCES OF
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND SPAIN 76 (Philadelphia & Johnson ed. 1839).
923 DOMINIQUEZ, op. cit. supra note 89, §131.
931d. §132.
94The temporary water body is referred to as an estanque; it is differentiated
from the lake, or lago. Id. §133.
OsWHrE, op. cit. supra note 91, at 24, 25.
962 BALBAS, REcOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS, Book IV,
title 17 (1756).
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Access to Non-navigable Lakes by Invitation of Riparians
If other approaches to public recreational use are unsuccessful,
there remains the possibility that members of the public may be
able to gain legal access to some of Florida's non-meandered lakes
by invitation of owners of the lakes. Such owners frequently im-
prove their beach areas and invite the public to make use of this
means of access for a fee. Although the legality of such use by non-
riparians has not been litigated in Florida, the recent case of Duval
v. Thomas97 has established the civil law rule that each owner is en-
titled to make use of the entire lake. A reference in the case to en-
joyment of the lake by the owner "and his guests" 98 may provide a
point of departure for limited public use of the sort suggested here.
Again, early Spanish recognition of public rights to make use of
lakes of this sort may be helpful in attaining this end. Other rami-
fications of this important case are discussed in Part III of this
article.99
PART II. RIGHTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO NAVIGABLE LAKES
RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS1s0
Ownership of a tract of land which is in contact with a navigable
lake entitles the owner of the land to put the water to an assortment
of uses. These uses are often inexactly denominated riparian rights. 10 1
The number and type of these uses have apparently not been limited
by the amount of riparian footage owned, nor have they generally
97114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
981d. at 795.
99See pp. 68-69 infra.
1osBecause of its Latin roots the term riparian rights is perhaps more properly
applied to watercourses than to lakes; littoral is sometimes used in connection
with the latter. For the sake of consistency in terminology, and because in general
the rights of an owner on a navigable lake are often similar to if not identical
with those on a navigable watercourse, the term riparian will be used throughout
in relation to both types of navigable water bodies.
lolSee FLA. STAT. §271.091 (1959): "Riparian rights are those incident to land
bordering on navigable waters." See also Mobile Transportation Co. v. City of
Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 30 So. 645 (1900); Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 113 So.
708 (1927); Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' &
Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909); Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61
Mont. 152, 201 Pac. 702 (1921).
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been limited by the angle which the boundary of the property makes
with the water's edge.102 The extent of the title that the owner must
hold in order to claim riparian rights is not clear. 0 3 The statements
in the reports are usually couched in general terms; a lessee pre-
sumedly would be entitled to riparian rights. 04
The point at which the upland -the land that borders a navi-
gable body of water-stops and the water begins is the high-water
mark. This is the point that separates private rights from public
rights; it is the point beyond which the law will not ordinarily
permit individual ownership. 0 5 But to be entitled to riparian rights
the owner must prove his ownership of the land to the high-water
mark. Should the calls of his deed fail to establish as a matter of
law that the lake or other body of navigable water constitutes one
of the boundaries of his property, the owner will be without any
rights to use of the water other than those he may claim as a member
of the general public.106
When a street parallels the edge of a navigable body of water,
separating the upland owner from the water, there are three possible
riparian claimants: the upland owner, the original dedicator or his
successors, and the public. The upland owner, in the absence of an
express grant, must base his claim upon a dedication that is con-
strued to give him title to the whole street. This construction is not
generally accepted, 0 7 and it has been specifically rejected by the
Florida Supreme Court. 0 8 Which of the other two claimants will
l02See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Bade, Title, Points and Lines
in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REv. 305 (1940); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 143 (1959).
I03For the interesting intimation that an owner of filled land may not qualify
for common law riparian rights, see Hayes v. Bowman, supra note 102; Bay Shore
v. Steckloff, 107 So.2d 171 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
1O4Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C.
618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).
3OSTampa So. R.R. v. Nettles, 82 Fla. 2, 89 So. 223 (1921).
106E.g., Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918) (Pensacola
Bay); Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 17 So. 411 (1896).
307See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 107 (3d ed. 1939): "A conveyance of land
as bounded 'on' or 'by,' or as running 'along' a highway, will convey to the
centerline of the highway, if the grantor owns thereto, unless a contrary intention
appears from the conveyance." Accord, Brooks v. City of West Miami, 41 So.2d 556
(Fla. 1949).
10sMarshall v. Hartman, 104 Fla. 143, 139 So. 441 (1932) (Halifax River); see
Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200 (1882) (plaintiff whose deed described his land
as bounded by a street which ran along the shore of Pensacola Bay denied status
of riparian ownership).
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prevail in a clash of interests must be determined by an examination
of the terms of the dedication. In Tarpon Springs v. Swett'0 9 the
public claimed, among other things, the right to load and unload
goats on Anclote Boulevard, bordering the Anclote River. There
had been a grant of an easement for the boulevard to the public. One
point of the decision was the holding that there was an implied dedi-
cation to the public of the riparian rights in the absence of an express
reservation by the dedicator. 1 0
The situation of a road running along the bank of a body of
water must be distinguished from that of a road terminating at the
water's edge. In the latter case the purpose of the road is to provide
a way into the water, and the appropriate riparian rights will be in
the owner of the easement - ordinarily the public - regardless of the
ownership of the fee.11
Once it is established that the owner of the upland has legal
ownership to the high-water mark, the question becomes one of lo-
cating that mark. In Tilden v. Smith the Florida Supreme Court, in
determining the location of the high-water mark on Lake Johns, a
navigable fresh-water lake in Orange County, quoted with approval
from a Minnesota case:' 1 2
" 'In the case of fresh water rivers and lakes - in which there
is no ebb and flow of the tide, but which are subject to ir-
regular and occasional changes of height, without fixed quan-
tity or time, except that they are periodical, recurring with
10981 Fla. 479, 88 So. 613 (1921).
i'OAccord, Barney v. Baltimore, 2 Fed. Cas. 886 (1863) (No. 1029), rev'd on
other grounds, 73 U.S. 280 (1867); Brickell v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 75 Fla. 612,
78 So. 681 (1918); Odell v. Pile, 260 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1953). But see Burrows v.
Gallup, 32 Conn. 493, 87 Am. Dec. 186 (1865). Of course, if the dedication of
a street constitutes a vesting of the fee in the public, rather than a mere easement
for street purposes, neither the owner abutting on the street nor the original
dedicator can lay claim to the riparian rights, since neither will own land in
contact with the body of water and the riparian rights will be in the public.
Webb v. City of Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116, 13 So. 289 (1891); Danielsville & Comer
Tel. Co. v. Sanders, 209 Ga. 144, 71 S.E.2d 226 (1952); Village of Lake Bluff v.
Dalitsch, 3 Ill. 2d 53, 114 N.E.2d 654 (1953); St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 114
Mo. 13, 21 S.W. 202 (1893); see 1 FARNHA.- §144. But see Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876).
11'See Marshall v. Hartman, 104 Fla. 143, 139 So. 441 (1932), and cases cited
therein; 1 FARNHAM §144a; cf. Feig v. Graves, 100 So.2d 192 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
11294 Fla. 502, 512, 113 So. 708, 712 (1927). See also Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla.
535, 112 So. 274 (1927) (Lake Okeechobee).
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the wet or dry seasons of the year -the high-water mark, as
a line between a riparian owner and the public, is to be de-
termined by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining
where the presence and action of the water are so common and
usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark
upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the
banks, in respect to vegetation, as well as respects the nature
of the soil itself.'"
What is the legal nature of the rights that result from riparian
ownership? It seems clear that in Florida, as in most Eastern juris-
dictions, riparian rights are property, a lawful taking of which
necessitates compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process."31 But while this much may be clear, the precise quality
of a riparian right as property is considerably less clear. The legal
mind is accustomed to thinking about property as specific rights in
relation to particular things and visualizing objects of property that
are inert in character and occupy an ascertainable situs, such as
buildings and furniture. Jurists, however, have experienced con-
siderable difficulty in their efforts to apply traditional property con-
cepts to an unfettered substance such as water.11 4 Attempts to solve
the problem of who owns the water in a navigable stream or lake re-
sulted in the early determination that there is no private property
in the substance of flowing water;" 5 the most a person can have is
a usufructuary right - a right to use the water."16
The rights of a riparian owner in a navigable lake can conven-
iently be considered under two headings: the right to use the waters
without consuming them, though in some circumstances so as to
affect their suitability for similar use by others; and the right to use
the waters so as to consume them.
'13See Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918); 1 FARNHAM
§63; Maloney and Plager, Florida's Streams, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 294, 300 (1957).
"14The juridical problem is not a unique one; the question of property in
ferae naturae has long been perplexing, See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Gaines (N.Y.
1805). The legislatures as well as the courts have wrestled with problems of
ownership of air, oil, and gas, and will soon be facing the same difficulties in
regard to outer space.
"2sPitkin v. Olmstead, 1 Root 217 (Conn. 1790); Symnes v. Prairie Pebble
Phosphate Co., 64 Fla. 480, 60 So. 223 (1912).
"GRancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 555, 81 P.2d 533, 561
(1938), quoted with approval in United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Utility Dist., 165
F. Supp. 806, 824 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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a. Non-consumptive Uses
Access and Navigation
Access to a navigable body of water from the upland and navi-
gation from the point of access to distant points on the same body of
water or to points on connecting bodies of water are, practically
speaking, a continuation of the same act. Yet they involve funda-
mentally different concepts and raise fundamentally different issues.
The right to enter or to leave the water is a right dependent upon
the ownership of the uplands, and thus it is a right subject to
exclusive control by the riparian owner. The courts in the vast
majority of riparian jurisdictions,' 1 7 including Florida," s consider
this right of access to be a valuable property right. They have not
hesitated to grant relief to a riparian owner whose access is ma-
terially interfered with or destroyed, though some courts have seem-
ingly made an exception when the injury to access is the result of
work done by the Government specifically for the improvement of
navigation."19
As to the right to navigate-to travel over the surface of the
water to distant points, whether for the transporting of agricultural
products grown on his riparian lands to market, or for the customers
of his fishing camp to reach a better fishing area in the lake, or simply
for his own pleasure -the status of the riparian owner is not so
clear. A fortiori, he has at least the same rights as any member of
the general public.
As noted under the section on wharves, any obstruction in a
navigable waterway that is not authorized by law is per se a nui-
sance; 120 any member of the public whose passage is interfered with
117See 1 FARNHAM 297; Annots., 21 A.L.R. 206 (1922); 15 A.L.R.2d 318 (1951)
(cases on preliminary mandatory injunctions to protect riparian rights).
11SFerry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' &
Shippers Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909); Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75
Fla. 28, 78, 78 So. 491, 506 (1918) (dictum); see Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795
(Fla. 1957); Tampa So. R.R. v. Nettles, 82 Fla. 2, 89 So. 223 (1921). But see Duval
Engr. and Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954).
119See Annot., 21 A.L.R. 215 (1922). Farnham, who wrote the annotation,
criticizes the line of cases establishing this exception. See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.
1156 (1934).
120See discussion under "Wharf and Fill," infra p. 34; cf. Strawn v. City of
Leesburg, 6 Fla. Supp. 124 (1954) (city liable for stringing electric wires across
navigable lake, causing injury to aircraft attempting to land).
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has the privilege of summarily abating or removing the obstruction .,
When the obstruction is authorized by law, the early cases held that
the public right to use the waterway as a highway would yield to
other public needs when the general good required it.122 Many of
these cases involved the power of the Congress or state legislatures to
authorize the construction of bridges across navigable rivers,23 al-
though a few of them dealt with the creation of dams.12 4 Little con-
sideration was given to the problem of the riparian owner whose
accessibility to connecting networks of waterways may have been im-
paired or completely blocked. 25 When the structure involved simply
interfered with passage or made it more inconvenient, as was often
the case with bridges spanning a river, whatever invasion there was
of the riparian's right of navigation was considered the price of
progress.2 1
When the obstruction to the navigable waterway completely de-
stroyed freedom of navigation past the structure, the answer was not
so easy. The question became in a sense one of the extent of the
riparian's right of access. Was his right simply one to enter the
water, or did he have a protectible right to pass the obstruction?
Communication via a waterway is often a significant element in
making riparian property valuable. Nevertheless, some courts have
held that the riparian has no protectible interest in navigating a
waterway; his right to navigate is simply as a member of the public,
and in the absence of some special inquiry he is without remedy. 12
121See, e.g., McLean v. Mathews, 7 Ill. App. 599 (1880); Selman v. Wolfe, 27
Tex. 68 (1863); Breese v. Wagner, 187 Wis. 109, 203 N.W. 764 (1925). But see
Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900); 54 L.R.A. 178 (1902).
l22See Annot., 59 L.R.A. 33, 44 (1903), and cases cited therein; cf. Marine Air
Ways v. State, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964, 280 App. Div. 1021 (3d Dep't 1952). See also
discussion under "Rights of the Public" infra.
123E.g., Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385 (1883); People ex rel.
Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899).
124E.g., State v. Godfrey, 24 Me. 232, 41 Am. Dec. 382 (1844); Woodward v.
Webb, 65 Pa. 254 (1870).
225See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
12GCarvalho v. Brooklyn & J. B. Turnpike Co., 76 N.Y. Supp. 859 (App. Div.
1900); see Annot., 59 L.R.A. 33, 81 (1903). For a recent case see Marine Air Ways
v. State, supra note 122.
l27Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 85, 51 At. 806, 809 (1901):
"The only right of the plaintiff interfered with . . .was his right of navigation
by water in and out of the cove through the channel. This right of the plaintiff,
however, was not his private property, nor even his private right. It could not be
bought, sold, leased, or inherited. He did not earn it, create it, or acquire it
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Courts are not in agreement as to what constitutes special injury
sufficient to entitle the riparian owner to object.28 The fact that
one member of the public does a larger volume of business over a
waterway than another would seem to be an example of the "different
in extent but not in kind" type of injury, for which, on the theory
of public nuisance, no private right of action exists.1 29 On the
other hand, an owner of property cut off from access to a general
system of navigable waterways seemingly is suffering injury different
in kind from that of the general public and should be entitled to
question the appropriateness of the obstruction, without having to
rely on public authorities to take the initiative. Two recent Florida
cases raised many of these issues.
The first of these cases was Webb v. Giddens.13° Giddens pur-
chased a parcel of land located on a small arm of Lake Jackson, a
navigable landlocked body of water in Leon County. He set himself
up in the business of renting boats to people who came to fish. To
reach the main part of the lake his customers passed under a wooden
state highway bridge that stretched across an arm of the lake. The
State Road Department, in the course of improving the highway, re-
moved the wooden bridge and built a fill completely spanning the
arm and effectively blocking Giddens and his customers from the
main part of the lake. 13'
Giddens sought a declaratory judgment as to his right to access
from his land to the main body of the lake. The chancellor rejected
the Road Department's argument that Giddens' riparian rights ended
when he reached the water from his uplands, and decreed that he
had the legal right to access to the main body of the lake for pur-
poses of fishing, hunting, and boating.
.... The right was the right of the public .... The plaintiff only shared in
the public right ... .The sovereign had the absolute control of it, and could
regulate, enlarge, limit, or even destroy it, as he might deem best for the whole
public; and this without making or providing for any compensation to such in-
dividuals as might be inconvenienced or damaged thereby." See also United
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); Bailey v. Driscoll, 34
N.J. Super. 228, 112 A.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
12sSee Annot., 59 L.R.A. 33, 81 (1903), and cases cited therein.
129Thomas v. Wade, 48 Fla. 311, 37 So. 743 (1904); see WAtsii, EQUITY 209
(1930).
1 o82 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1955).
131The road across the arm of the lake contained a large culvert connecting
the arm with the main lake, but the trial court specifically found that the cul-
vert did not provide a practical means of access by boat; the culvert was appar-
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On appeal, Justice Hobson, speaking for the Supreme Court, cited
Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A. Ry.'13 for the proposition that one of the
common law riparian rights was the right of ingress and egress to and
from the water over the owner's land. He stated that the question
before the Court was whether the denial of ingress and egress deprived
Giddens of "a practical incident of his riparian proprietorship."13
3
The Court held that Giddens' right of ingress and egress would be
virtually meaningless unless he were allowed access to the main body
of the lake;134 the decree of the lower court was affirmed.
Carmazi v. Board of County Commissioners 35 presented the
question of whether cutting off access by boat to Biscayne Bay from
waterfront property on Little River was deprival of a property right.
Little River is a navigable 36 stream running through the City of
Miami and emptying into Biscayne Bay. Dade County had previously
constructed a dam across the river some distance upstream from the
point where it joins Biscayne Bay. The effect of the dam was to
block egress by boat to the bay for any riparian owners upstream of
the dam. It also prevented passage up or down the river past the site
of the dam for any members of the public. In 1956 two owners of
property above the dam brought suit against the county for an ad-
judication of their rights and for damages.137
While the suit was pending the Central and Southern Florida
Flood Control District, a state agency, 38 petitioned to intervene. The
Flood Control District proposed to construct a salt water intrusion
dam across Little River considerably further downstream. The pe-
tition was granted, and additional parties - the riparian owners along
the stretch of the river between the old county dam and the site of
the new district dam-were impleaded. In its final decree the trial
court found no encroachment upon the property rights of these
"riparian owners."
The district court of appeal3 9 distinguished the riparian owner's
ently completely submerged for about 18 months after it was installed.
13275 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918).
'3382 So.2d at 245.
134But see Innis v. Cedar Rapids, I.F. & N.W. Ry., 76 Iowa 165, 40 N.W. 701
(1888).
135108 So.2d 318 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
a36In this case, as in Giddens, the characterization as navigable was apparently
not questioned.
l37This suit was eventually dismissed at the trial level.
138FLA. STAT. ch. 378 (1959).
139An appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which held that it
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right to launch his boat in the water immediately adjacent to his
property from his right to navigate. He had no private right to navi-
gate on public waters; his right to navigate was a public right which
accrued to him because he was a member of the public and not
because of any particular riparian status that he might have. When
the public lost its right to navigate on Little River the riparian owner
likewise lost his.
The difficulty in reconciling this result with the decision in the
Giddens case is at once obvious. But the Supreme Court's decision
in Giddens was distinguished as "premised upon equitable grounds
due to the unusual facts and circumstances existent in that case."
These "unusual" facts and circumstances, however, were that the
state left the riparian owner with access only to the water immediately
in front of his property. He was thereby prevented from per-
mitting others to enjoy the fruits of his riparian ownership for a
fee. In the Carmazi case, on the other hand, the riparian owners
apparently desired to make personal rather than commercial use of
their right of egress. It seems questionable that Mr. Giddens should
be specially protected on this basis. The cases are not irreconcilable,
however. To the extent that the Carmazi decision holds that a ri-
parian owner does not have a private property right to travel over
navigable waters, even those adjacent to his uplands, it is consistent
with the position taken by many other courts. 140 And Webb v. Gid-
dens does not say otherwise. What Webb v. Giddens does seem to
say is that for travel over a navigable body of water to be materially
obstructed by the state there must be an overriding public interest
that justifies depriving either the public or the riparian of the en-
joyment of this right.
Webb v. Giddens also established that whether such an obstruc-
tion is called a public nuisance from which the riparian owner sus-
tains special injury, or whether it is called a private nuisance as to
him, the riparian owner has the individual right to object and to
have the courts hear his objection.
The conclusion in Webb v. Giddens was that replacing a bridge
with a dirt fill was an unwarranted deprival of the right to navigate.
In Carmazi, once the district court concluded that the plaintiff's
rights were in fact merely public rights, it dealt summarily with them.
The court stated, "[I1t has long been recognized that governmental
was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the cause was transferred to
the Court of Appeal for the Third District.
140See notes 127, 128 supra.
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functions, although they may deprive private interests of certain
privileges, are justified as a necessary exercise of the police power
for the benefit of the public."''4 Yet the only statement in the opinion
concerning the necessity for this exercise was that "the necessity for
the dam has been found to be in the public interest by a solemn
pronouncement of the Congress of the United States."' 42
It may be true that the solemnity with which Congress acts is a
consideration, but it seems equally true that before the citizens of
Florida are deprived of the use of the state's navigable waterways,
other factors should also be considered. Even assuming that the
salt-water intrusion problem in the Little River area is serious
enough to warrant interference with public navigation-and there
appears to be ample evidence that this is the case' 43 - there is nothing
in the Carmazi opinion to indicate that consideration was given to
providing means for bypassing the dam. 4 4  If feasible, such pro-
visions might properly have been made a condition to the withhold-
ing from the riparians the broader relief of prohibiting the dam. 45
Fishing, Swimming, and Hunting
Fishing and swimming, although often described as riparian
rights, are pleasures which the law generally makes as much avail-
able to a non-riparian who can obtain lawful access to the water as
to a riparian; and these rights are sometimes referred to as rights
held in common with the public146 The right to hunt on a navigable
lake or other navigable body of water is not customarily spoken of
as peculiarly a riparian right, and therefore will be considered infra
in connection with public rights.
141108 So.2d at 325.
'd2Ibid.
143See W AT R RESOURCES OF SotHEASTEE FLORIDA 580-91 and plate 17 (1955)
(Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 1255), documenting the steadily worsening
condition of the ground water supply in the Miami area.
144See WATER REsOURCES DEVELOPMENT RY THE U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS
IN FLOPRIA 13 (1959) (Okeechobee Waterway, Oklawaha River).
143For cases granting analogous partial relief see City of Lakeland v. State
ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940); National Container Corp. v. State,
138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939).
146E.g., Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 560, 82 So. 221, 227 (1919) (dictum);
Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 413, 48 So. 643, 645 (1909) (dictum); see Adams v. Elliott, 128
Fla. 79, 87, 174 So. 731, 734 (1937) (dictum). See also 2 FARNHAM 1364.
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The English common law, with its penchant for classification
and its passion for ownership, considered the right to take fish a
right savoring of realty, and held that the exclusive right to the fish
was in the owner of the bed. 14 7 But land lying under water subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide was held by the Crown for the benefit
of the public, and therefore a public right to fish in these waters
was recognized. 141 To the extent that tidewaters rather than privately
owned fresh-water lakes comprised a substantial portion of the
English waters suitable for fishing, the common law rule did little
to deprive the public of fishing rights.
In American jurisdictions the common law precedents have gen-
erally insured public ownership of beds of tidal waters and thus
guaranteed the public right of fishing in these waters. The English
rule as it relates to private rights to fish in non-tidal waters such as
inland lakes has received varied treatment at the hands of the
courts.
1 49
When the bed of a navigable lake is held by the state in trust for
the people, as it is in Florida,15° the riparian owner cannot claim
the benefit of the English rule. His right to fish must be attributed
either to his ownership of land bordering on the lake or, if a public
right to fish is recognized, to his being a member of the public. In
either case he would not appear entitled to claim an exclusive right.
State power to regulate fishing in navigable waters, including
lakes, has never been seriously questioned. Since Magna Charta,
regulation of the time and manner of taking fish in navigable waters
has been a recognized function of government. 151 The regulatory
power of the state reaches everyone, including the riparian owner;
147E.g., Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q.B.D. 162 (1882); Reece v. Miller, 8 Q.B.D. 626
(1882); see 2 F\RNHIM 1427; 3 KFNT. Comm. 410 (3d ed. 1836).
14SSee 2 FARNIAM, NVATFRS AND WATERCOURSES 1364 (1904), and cases cited.
149English rule followed: Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447, 92 Am. Dec. 146
(1867); Lambeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890); New England Trout
& Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 At. 323 (1896); see Hood v. Murphy, 231
Ala. 408, 165 So. 219 (1936); Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481 (1818); State v. Bollen-
bach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.V.2d 278 (1954); Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns 90,
11 Am. Dec. 249 (N.Y. 1822). English rule not followed: Hall v. Wantz, 336
Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 462 (1953); State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co.,
187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940).
a5OBroward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909); see discussion under head-
ing "Florida's Trust Doctrine," Pt. 1 supra.
151See State v. Head, 96 Fla. 799, 119 So. 376 (1928); Ex parte Powell, 70 Fla.
363, 70 So. 392 (1915) (tidal water); Bannon v. Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63 So. 454
(1913); FLA. STAT. cc. 370, 372 (1959); 2 FARNHAM 1393-95.
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this is true even though he has title to the portion of the bed of the
lake upon which he fishes.15 2
What has been said by the courts regarding fishing is probably
equally true of swimming or bathing, although much of it has been
in general terms and by way of dictum.153 The few cases that have
specifically raised the question of a riparian owner's right to swim
in a lake have generally arisen in connection with governmental
attempts to limit or prohibit use of the lake when the water is de-
sired as part of the public water supply. No one today questions
the state's power to protect and insure the purity of public water
supplies. When the regulation is designed to limit public use of
water sources, power to protect the public health and welfare 54 or
to control and regulate public rights 55 has provided ample basis for
almost unlimited regulation.156 When an effort is made to restrict
use by a riparian owner, the concept of private property may bar
governmental regulation without compensation. 57
In view of the Florida Court's repeated assertions that a riparian
owner has the right to swim and that riparian rights are property
rights, it seems clear that a statute or ordinance purporting to pro-
hibit a riparian owner from swimming in adjacent waters without
any provision for compensating him for his loss would be an un-
constitutional taking of property5s
ls2Bannon v. Logan, supra note 151; see People v. Bridges, 142 Ill. 30, 31
N.E. 115 (1892); State v. Lowder, 198 Ind. 234, 153 N.E. 399 (1926); Peters v.
State, 96 Tenn. 682, 36 SA. 399 (1896).
' 53 See cases cited note 146 supra. See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 561 (1958)
("Rights of Fishing, Boating, Bathing, or the Like in Inland Lakes").
154State v. Quattropani, 99 Vt. 360, 133 At. 352 (1926).
'15Sprague v. Minon, 195 Mass. 581, 81 N.E. 284 (1907).
ls6Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 La. 737, 33 So.2d 503 (1947) (ordinance pro-
hibiting flying over a lake but not prohibiting boating on it upheld).
157E.g., People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902); Richardson v.
Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 95 A.2d 122 (1953); George v. Chester, 202 N.Y. 398, 95
N.E. 767 (1911). See also Willis v. Wilkins, 92 N.H. 400, 32 A.2d 321 (1943);
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 790 (1957). Contra, State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 Atl.
337 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938); State v. Morse, 94 Vt. 387, 80
Atl. 189 (1911).
'SSThis is in no way inconsistent with the position that maintaining a com-
mercial operation, such as a bathing beach, and causing contamination so as to
make the water unsuitable for a public water supply may well be an unreasonable
use of the water as against a municipality, itself a riparian owner, and properly
enjoinable at the behest of the municipality. Cf. Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125,
77 So. 666 (1918), discussed under heading "Rights Attributable to Non-Navi-
gable Lakes" infra. Accord, Newton v. Groesbeck, 299 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App.
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Wharf and Fill
If a body of water is non-navigable there seems to be little ques-
tion that the owner of uplands who also owns an adjoining portion
of the bed can construct a wharf or pier on his land, as long as it
does not unreasonably interfere with his neighbors' use of the
water. This is simply a specific application of the ancient tenet
that a man may use his property as he sees fit as long as his use is
not unreasonable in relation to neighboring uses.
If, however, the body of water is navigable, the riparian owner
must be concerned not only with the rights of his fellow riparians
but the rights of the public. Prior to the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
when Thomas Digges first advanced his theory that the Crown held
title to the lands under tidewaters, if the shore owner desired to
project a structure into the water for any purpose, he did so without
question from anyone.159 After Digges' theory took hold, wharves
placed upon land covered by water were regarded as encroachments
upon the property of the sovereign and therefore as purprestures
which the Crown could seize and use according to its pleasure. Farn-
ham states that the first statute with respect to the control of Crown
lands was passed during the reign of Anne, only a short time after
the establishment of the doctrine that wharves upon Crown land
were purprestures. He continues: 160
"After the passage of that statute discussion of the question
of purpresture or no purpresture no longer appears, but the
question in every instance is whether or not the structure is a
nuisance. No structure in a navigable water way is a nuisance
unless it interferes with the public rights of navigation."
When the American states assumed the rights of sovereignty
formerly belonging to the English Crown, many jurisdictions relaxed
the sovereign concept of purpresture and conceded that a riparian
owner has the right to wharf out from his upland in order to improve
his access to navigable water, subject to such reasonable regulations
1927); see Battle Creek v. Goguac Resort Ass'n, 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441
(1914). See also Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352,
150 At. 60 (1930). But see discussion under "b. Consumptive Uses" infra.
15SSee I FARNIAM, WATERS AND WATERCOURSES 527 (1904).
16old. at 529.
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as the state may impose, and to the public rights of navigation. 16 1
A number of rationalizations for the rule were offered by the courts,
but essentially the rule is simply a recognition that the doctrine by
which the state holds the title to lands under navigable waters in
trust for all the people is designed to protect and promote the public
interest rather than to further the sovereign's personal prerogatives.
There is no necessity to hinder a riparian owner's use of the water,
either in his capacity as a riparian or a member of the public, un-
less his use unreasonably interferes with the public right.162
A few courts have denied the riparian owner the right to erect a
wharf upon land under navigable water, and have invoked the
common law idea that any construction below high-water mark,
without license, is an encroachment which the sovereign may de-
molish, seize, or rent at pleasure.163 In these jurisdictions if a wharf
is injurious to commerce or navigation, it constitutes a public nui-
sance and can be abated or enjoined; if it does not constitute a
nuisance but is simply a purpresture, it belongs to the state and can
be subject to an action in ejectment.164
Even in jurisdictions that recognize a common law riparian right
to wharf, the wharf cannot extend beyond the point of navigability
or otherwise unreasonably interfere with the right of public navi-
gation; if it does it becomes a nuisance and is subject to abatement.265
The right of the state to regulate the erection of wharves, including
absolute prohibition if necessary to protect the public good, has
161E.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Long, 72 Conn. 10, 43 At. 559 (1899)
(Thomas River); Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364, 95 Am. Dec. 644 (1868)
(Ohio River); Delaplaine v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 214 (1877). See also
Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 23 (1861) (Lake Michigan); Illinois v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 33 Fed. 730 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888), afJ'd, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Annot.,
40 L.R.A. 735 (1905).
162A number of these early cases involved ports and harbors where loading and
unloading of deep-draft vessels was a major link in the conduct of trade. If the
riparian owner could not erect a wharf no one could; the erection of a wharf
by a stranger, including the state, would be an interference with the upland
owner's right of access, a right everyone recognized. See 1 FARNHAM 537, n.14.
163Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 118, 89 Am. Dec. 164 (1866)
(San Francisco Bay); Revell v. People, 177 Ill. 468, 52 N.E. 1052 (1898); Bowlby v.
Shively, 22 Ore. 410, 30 Pac. 154 (1892), aff'd, 152 U.S. 1 (1893). See also Martin
v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 (1857).
164People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379 (1866).
165E.g., Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35, 13 Am. Rep. 302 (1872), modifying
29 Ind. 364, 95 Am. Dec. 644 (1868) (Ohio River); cases cited note 161 supra.
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never been much in doubt; and many states have enacted such
legislation.' 66
The first Florida statute was the Riparian Act of 1856.167 The
act stated that it is for the benefit of commerce that wharves be
built and warehouses erected to facilitate the landing and storage
of goods, and that the state's proprietorship of submerged lands
prevents the riparian owner from improving his water lots. The act
therefore authorized riparian owners on any navigable stream, or bay
of the sea, or harbor, to wharf out as far as may be necessary to
effect the purposes described. It prohibited obstruction of the
channel and provided that space be left for the requirements of
commerce. It further authorized the riparian owner to fill in the
area in front of his uplands, and provided for the vesting of title
to such improved lands in the riparian owner. The mass of litigation
involving this act and its 1921 successor, the Butler Bill, 168 and
the abuses to which the acts lent themselves' 6 9 are beyond the scope
of this article.1 70 These acts by express proviso excepted lakes, other
than tidewater lakes, from their operation.
In the first case construing the Riparian Act of 1856, the Court
denied the plaintiff, who claimed the fee in a street that had been
dedicated to the public and that ran down to the Gulf of Mexico,
the right to wharf, on the ground that he did not have the type of
ownership contemplated by the act.171 In discussing the plaintiff's
contention that the defendant's wharf would be a nuisance the Court
stated that wharves are indispensable to commerce, and that no
city or town could be without them. The question of whether the
wharf would be injurious was one of fact.
In Sullivan v. Moreno172 a wharf extending into the waters of
Pensacola Bay was attacked as a public nuisance. The Court con-
sidered that the argument was based on the view that the construc-
166E.g., FLA. STAT. §253.122 (1959) (the state bulkhead act, but apparently not
applicable to fresh-water lakes, rivers, and streams); see I FARNHIAM 544, n.2, 545,
n.3, 550, n.13, and cases cited therein; 40 L.R.A. 635, 640 (1905).
167Fla. Laws 1856, ch. 791. See also FLA. STAT. ch. 309 (1959) (deposit of
material in tidewater regulated).
168Fla. Laws 1921, ch. 8537.
169See the candid remarks of Drew, C.J., and Roberts, J., in Trustees of Internal
Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1956).
170See Hunt, Riparian Rights in Florida, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 393, 395 (1955),
for a brief discussion of these acts.
17Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325 (1859).
17219 Fla. 200 (1882).
FLORIDA'S LAKES
tion of a wharf in navigable waters is per se a nuisance in this
state, a view the Court declared to be in error. It considered a
wharf a purpresture, the construction of which was subject to sover-
eign control, but stated that the sovereign by the Riparian Act of
1856 had expressly authorized construction of wharves in tidal bays.
The conclusion was that "a plaintiff makes no case of nuisance by
a simple allegation of the construction of a wharf .... "173
In the absence of express authorization by the sovereign, does a
riparian owner in Florida have a right to erect and maintain a wharf
on sovereignty lands in front of his uplands, for example, on a fresh
water navigable lake? The Florida position is not at all clear. Ap-
parently there have been no cases directly involving wharves built
into lakes, but two cases have arisen involving piers built into the
Atlantic Ocean. In the first, Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corp.,
174
the plaintiff, who owned an ocean front lot adjacent to the defendant,
claimed that the defendant's pier transgressed upon the plaintiff's
riparian rights. The Court set the stage with the statement that
"the Riparian Acts of 1856 . . . and 1921 . . . are applicable only
to 'any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor.' The locus in
quo here is on the ocean front."1 75 The opinion states:176
"Riparian or littoral owners to ordinary high-water mark
on the ocean or gulf or other navigable waters have, by the
common law, a qualified right with the consent or acquiescence
of the state . . . to erect wharves or piers or docks in front of
the riparian holdings to facilitate access to and the use of the
navigable waters, subject to lawful state regulation . . . . If
such wharves or piers or docks are erected without due au-
thority, they may be removed as purprestures, or if they are
or become nuisances or are harmful to the rights of the public,
they may be removed or abated by due course of law."
The only authorization from any agency of the state that the de-
fendant could muster for his pier was a 1925 resolution of the City
of Miami Beach stating that it had no objection to this particular
1731d. at 229. See also Hicks v. State, 116 Fla. 603, 156 So. 603 (1934) (wharf
on navigable Lake Santa Fe authorized by permit from Trustees of Internal Im-
provement Fund).
17493 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841 (1927).
1751d. at 899, 112 So. at 845.
1761d. at 898, 112 So. at 844. (Emphasis added.)
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pier.' 7  The plaintiff was denied relief on the ground of laches,
although the Court carefully pointed out that "the sovereign rights
of the state . . . in the premises are not affected by this adjudica-
tion."'78
In Adams v. Elliott1 79 the plaintiff was injured when a car in
which she was riding collided with one of the pilings supporting
the defendant's pier, which extended over the beach into the ocean
at Atlantic Beach. The pier stood some twenty feet above the
ground and extended into the ocean a considerable distance. The
Court stated that "riparian or littoral upland owners may construct
appropriate piers or wharfs [sic] over and across the beach to reach
the water for authorized purposes,"'180 but that if piers or their sup-
ports are negligently maintained, and the negligence is the proximate
cause of injury to one lawfully and with due care traveling on the
beach, ' 8s the pier owners will be subject to legal liability.
The most direct statement concerning the riparian owner's right
to wharf in the absence of an express legislative grant appears in
the 1931 case of Williams v. Guthrie.,8 2 Justice Brown, joined by
two of the other justices in a concurring opinion,'8 3 stated that he
was inclined to the view that the riparian proprietor holding title to
the high-water mark, in the absence of any statute to the contrary,
is vested with the right to wharf out so as to reach a navigable portion
of the stream or body of water, subject to police regulation by the
state. He added that this doctrine does not change the title to sub-
merged land below high-water mark in navigable waters, which re-
mains in the state. The case involved an action in ejectment by one
claiming as heir of an alleged owner of a pier built upon the sub-
merged bottom of Sarasota Bay against a defendant claiming as
grantee of the owner. The trial court construed the defendant's
deed against him and gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Court stated that if the issue was simply
one of construction of the deed the judgment would be affirmed.
177Two years later the Florida legislature amended the city charter to authorize
the city to control the use of submerged lands along the ocean front. Fla. Laws
1927, ch. 13101.
17893 Fla. at 902, 112 So. at 846.
19128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731 (1937).
1801d. at 84, 174 So. at 733.
181Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, ch. 10486, declared this section of the beach to be a
public highway.
182102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682 (1931).
18ld. at 1054, 137 So. at 685.
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But, the Court went on, this wharf, located on land below high-
water mark in navigable tide waters, appeared to fall within the
category of what is known in the law as a purpresture. The Court
stated that a purpresture such as a building or wharf erected without
license upon lands below high-water mark may at the suit of the
state either be demolished or seized and rented for the sovereign's
benefit if not a nuisance to navigation. And "this is true, though
it be conceded that in this state riparian owners have the riparian
right to construct wharves from the upland to reach the navigable
water, when not objected to by the sovereign or specifically forbidden
by statute."' 84 The conclusion was that the plaintiff, who could re-
cover only in ejectment on the strength of his own title, could not
maintain his action; when the recovery sought is of a purpresture,
no private suitor has a sufficient title. 85 The Court indicated that
other remedies might be available to a riparian proprietor, but did
not elaborate on what these would be. 8 6
It may be well to note at this point that several Florida cases
involving other riparian rights contain statements on the right to
wharf. These statements are by and large irreconcilably in conflict
and can be given little credence. For example, in State v. Black
River Phosphate Co.,'8 7 in which the Court attempted to justify the
legislative grant in the Riparian Act of 1856, a statement appears
to the effect that the purpose of the Riparian Act was to permit
riparian owners to wharf out into the waters to facilitate landing,
and that the statute was necessary because the "ownership of the
1841d. at 1053, 137 So. at 685.
BssAccord, Bass v. Ramos, 58 Fla. 161, 50 So. 945 (1909). See also Leonard v.
Baylen Street Wharf Co., 59 Fla. 547, 551, 52 So. 718, 719 (1910) (Pensacola Bay):
[T]he grantee of [a wharf franchise] had no inheritable interest in the wharf
property except as incident to the franchise. It may fairly be assumed that the
franchise right was the only property right the decedent had in a wharf that
presumably is upon navigable waters not subject to private ownership."
iSoThe body of water involved here was a bay of the sea-why did not the
Court permit the plaintiff the benefit of the Riparian Acts of 1856 and 1921?
On petition for rehearing the Court stated that it had not overlooked these
acts but that when title to submerged land is asserted to vest in private owner-
ship and not in the state, in which title would otherwise be assumed to be vested,
it is incumbent upon the pleader to allege and prove sufficient facts to negative
the presumptive title in the state and to show that title to the lands has become
vested in private owners. In the Court's view the plaintiff had failed to establish
that his wharf was the type of permanent improvement contemplated by the
riparian acts.
28732 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893).
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State and its consequent powers [over beds under navigable waters]
were a bar to the riparian owner building such wharves or improv-
ing their riparian lots in any of the ways permitted by the statute
. .. 118 On the other hand, in Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n the Court, in
elaborating on the various common law rights available to the ri-
parian owner, said:18 9
"Subject to the superior rights of the public as to navigation
and commerce, and to the concurrent rights of the public as
to fishing and bathing and the like, a riparian owner may
erect upon the bed and shores adjacent to his riparian hold-
ings bath houses, wharves, or other structures to facilitate his
business or pleasure .... "
The right to erect a wharf out to the point of navigability is
based on the theory that the wharf stimulates the use of the waters
for navigation and commerce and thus promotes the public good.
In Florida, where the public good is as intimately connected with
recreational activity as it is with commercial shipping, a narrow
concept of public good would seem inappropriate. Perhaps a ri-
parian owner on a lake who constructs a wharf for his pleasure boat
should be limited to a smaller structure than one on a tidal bay who
designs his wharf for commercial traffic, but it would seem that the
interest of one is as worthy of protection as the interest of the other,
as long as neither invades the right of the public.
Assuming that a riparian owner on a navigable Florida lake has
a right to erect a wharf, does this right extend to filling and thus
raising the submerged lands above the level of the lake? That this
is a problem in a number of counties in Florida today is documented
by a 1956 water problem study. 90 In the absence of legislation simi-
1881d. at 109, 13 So. at 649. This case has been recently cited, in an otherwise
excellent study, as aligning Florida with the jurisdictions denying a riparian owner
the right to wharf out into navigable waters. WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
54, n.14 (U. of Mich. Law School 1958).
18957 Fla. 399, 403, 48 So. 643, 645 (1909). See Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry.,
75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918), in which the Court indicates that there is no
common law right to wharf out to the channel, but there is a right to wharf
out as far as the low-water mark. See also Deering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So.
54 (1928).
19OSee FLORIDA WATER RESOURCFS STUDY CoMtM'N, REPORT OF COUNTY CONI-
XnITTEFS ON WATER PROBLEMS (1956) §II.A.6. at 11 (Citrus County), 36 (Highlands
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lar to the riparian acts, the right to use the space between the shore
and deep water is limited to uses in furtherance of navigation. There-
fore, whatever structures the riparian owner in the exercise of his
right places there must be in aid of navigation, and he cannot use
the space for structures for other purposes.' 9 '
A 1953 circuit court case,192 although involving ocean front rather
than lake front property, is of considerable interest. Suit was brought
by the county solicitor and the Citizens' League of Miami Beach
against the City of Miami Beach and the hotel owners along the
beach for an injunction seeking to abate an alleged public nuisance
maintained by the hotel owners. The plaintiffs alleged that the
hotels extended out over the foreshore of the ocean and requested
that the court determine whether the city had authority to issue
permits for such structures. The 1927 Florida Legislature had passed
an amendment to the charter of Miami Beach empowering the city
to fix a harbor line and to control and prohibit the use of sub-
merged land east thereof. In 1948 the Miami Beach City Council
passed three ordinances establishing such a harbor line and pro-
viding that no bulkhead or other structure should be constructed
east of the line. Proceeding under these ordinances, the line was
fixed on or east of the foreshore - the beach between high-water and
low-water marks - and riparian hotel owners were granted permission
to construct bulkheads, fill in, and erect structures out to this line.
The result was that in most instances the upland owners took over
the beach and foreshore and used them for purposes incident to
operating the hotels. The result was to exclude the public from por-
tions of the beach between high-water and low-water marks.
The chancellor held that in the absence of an enabling statute
an upland or riparian owner cannot appropriate the state-owned
land between ordinary high-water and low-water marks. The court
pointed out that, consistent with the trust under which the state
holds title to the beds of navigable waters, the state, through legisla-
tion, can authorize use by individuals or the public for purposes other
than boating, fishing, swimming, and recreation if there is sufficient
over-all benefit derived thereby or if the public's use thereof for these
primary purposes is not eliminated or unduly withheld. As examples
of this type of legislative authorization the court cited the Riparian
and Hillsborough counties), 43 (Lake County), 46 (Leon County), 66 (Pasco
County).
'I-See 1 FARNHAM 549, n.9, and cases cited therein.
192State v. Simberg, 4 Fla. Supp. 85 (1953).
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Act of 1856 and the statutes designating various sections of beach as
public highways. In the court's view, individual operation of a hotel
or apartment building adjacent to the foreshore is not of sufficient
benefit to the people to justify surrender by the public of that portion
of the state-owned beach to the individual. The court therefore en-
joined the City of Miami Beach from granting to any upland or
riparian owners or any other person authority to construct a sea
wall, bulkhead, or any structure other than groynes or jetties on or
across the foreshore of the Atlantic Ocean. 193
Finally, in 1956, the question of a riparian owner's right to fill
in a portion of the bed of a navigable lake came before the Florida
Supreme Court.1 9 4 Suit was brought by the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund to enjoin the riparian owners from dredging in
Lake Ariana, a navigabless fresh water lake in Polk County, and
from using the soil from the lake to build a peninsula extending
from the defendant's uplands. The trial court granted the injunction.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court the defendants contended,
among other things, that if Lake Ariana is in fact navigable, their
riparian rights include the right to extend their land out from the
shoreline and over the bottom of the lake. The Court dealt with this
summarily, stating:196
"This contention could be colorably maintained, on the state
of facts here presented, only by reference to the "Butler Bill"
which, however, excluded lakes other than tidewater lakes
from its operation. . . . Appellants cannot acquire title to
sovereignty lands in this fashion."
View
In Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A. Ry., a 1918 suit for damages by a
landowner against a railroad for placing its tracks on land it filled in
193After entry of the decree by the lower court the Miami Beach City Council
voted 4 to 2 not to appeal the decree.
194McDowell v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 90 So.2d 715 (Fla.
1956). See also Adams v. Crews, 105 So.2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (Lake Mait-
land, Orange County).
195The defendants recognized the importance of the navigability classification
and contended that the lake was in fact and in law non-navigable. Both the trial
court and the Supreme Court thought otherwise.
19690 So.2d at 718.
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along the foreshore in front of the landowner's property, the Florida
Court stated that in addition to the riparian right of ingress and
egress the common law riparian proprietor "enjoys [the right] of
unobstructed view over the waters .... .. 97 The Court apparently
felt that such a well-recognized principle of law needed no citation.
However, the earlier authorities were silent concerning this "common
law" right,19 and a search of the precedents involving riparian rights
reveals only one other jurisdiction that has mentioned view as a
possible incident of riparian ownership. In a 1944 West Virginia
case, the court in deciding that the defendant's disposal of effluent
from his tannery into a river flowing past the plaintiff's house was
not a private wrong for which an action could be maintained, asked
itself if the plaintiff had a special right to enjoy the river in its
original beauty. The court answered that "a riparian owner has no
proprietary right in a beautiful scene presented by a river any more
than any other owner of land could claim to a beautiful landscape."'199
From the viewpoint of the common law, the West Virginia court was
on firmer ground than the Florida Court.200 Thus, when the Florida
Court spoke of unobstructed view as a common law right, it intro-
duced a new member into the collection of rights a riparian owner
can claim.
Does the concept of unobstructed view give a Florida riparian
owner a right not available to riparians in other jurisdictions? In
Thiesen the Court, after lengthy debate and a rehearing, reversed a
directed verdict for the defendant railroad, holding that the defend-
ant's conduct constituted a taking of the plaintiff's property - his
right of access to his lands over the waters, and his unobstructed view
of the bay - conduct that the legislature could not lawfully authorize
without compensation.
19775 Fla. 28, 58, 78 So. 491, 501 (1918) (Pensacola Bay).
198E.g., Farnham, in his monumental 3-volume work WATERS AND WATER RiGirr$
(1904), makes no mention of a common law riparian right of view.
.99International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 892, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540
(1944).
20oSee, e.g., "But depriving one of a mere matter of pleasure, as of a fine
prospect, by building a wall, or the like . . . abridges nothing really convenient
or necessary, is no injury to the sufferer, and is therefore not an actionable
nuisance." 3 BL. COMM. *217; "Where there is no infringement of a right to light,
and where the act complained of is otherwise lawful, no action lies for . . . the
obstruction of a view or prospect, even though the value of a house or premises
may be diminished thereby," 24 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 54-55 (2d ed. 1937),
citing cases as early as 1610 and as late as 1931.
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Three years later another landowner sued another railroad on a
similar set of facts. This time the landowner wanted an injunction to
prevent the railroad from continuing its alleged interference with the
plaintiff's riparian rights in the Manatee River. The trial court,
perhaps impressed by the Supreme Court's view of "view," overruled
a demurrer to the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, pointing
out that the railroad structure did not appear to impair the land-
owner's access to the water materially, and stating that "the right
of view is apparently not so obstructed as to warrant an injunction
to restrain the lawful erection of an authorized public utility across
the navigable river."2
0 1
In 1927 a different factual situation was presented in Freed v.
Miami Beach Pier Corp.202 The defendant built a pier forty-five
feet long extending into the Atlantic Ocean from its ocean-front
lot. The pier was about fifteen degrees short of a right angle to the
shoreline, with the result that the outer portion was within lines
extended at right angles to the shoreline from the corners of the
plaintiff's adjacent lot. The Court stated that the outer portion of
the pier did not materially affect the plaintiff's access to and use of
the waters. The conclusion was that the partial obstruction to distant
view would not justify an injunction when the right of access was
not materially impaired, especially since the plaintiff did not seek
relief until after extensive construction had taken place at consider-
able cost to the defendant. In a brief concurring opinion, one of
the judges stated that "this right of view [is] one of the most valu-
able of the rights of the riparian proprietor," but added that the
conclusion of the majority was well grounded on the principles of
laches and estoppel. °3
A year later the Court in Deering v. Martin2 4 reversed a dis-
missal of an action to enjoin a sale of submerged lands in Biscayne
Bay by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. Among the
grounds acknowledged by the justices as entitling the plaintiff to his
day in court was the fact that the proposed development by the
purchasers of the submerged land would interfere with and virtually
destroy the plaintiff's unobstructed view of the bay.
The doctrine of view was not seen again in the decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court until 1954, when the City of Jacksonville
'olampa So. R.R. v. Nettles, 82 Fla. 2, 3, 89 So. 223 (1921).
20293 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841 (1927).
2031d. at 902, 112 So. at 846.
20495 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928).
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decided to unsnarl its traffic by constructing an expressway bridge in
the bed of the St. Johns River. The plaintiff, who owned the uplands
in front of the proposed bridge site, sought to enjoin construction
of the bridge and to require condemnation proceedings. 20 5 The
Supreme Court dealt in almost summary fashion with the plaintiff's
allegations of injury to his riparian rights, including view, and held
that these rights were not sufficiently injured to warrant compensation.
Presumably the plaintiff's access to the water remained essentially
unimpaired.206
In the most recent case 207 the plaintiff complained that his un-
obstructed view of Boca Ciega Bay as well as his right of ingress and
egress over the waters of the bay from his land to the channel was
about to be destroyed by the defendant's proposed extension of a
near-by peninsula. The Court recognized that the plaintiff had the
rights alleged, but held that the particular facts involved in the
defendant's fill would not interfere with them.
Only two of the Florida cases discussed above were decided in
favor of the riparian owner who claimed an interference with his
right to unobstructed view. 208 In both cases other riparian rights,
primarily the right to access to the water, were at least equally in-
volved. More significantly, the Court denied relief in the two cases
in which access to the water was apparently not materially im-
paired. 20 9 To date, then, the riparian owner's right to a view of an
open expanse of water has not proved to be as inviolate as his more
traditional riparian rights, such as ingress and egress. Nevertheless
the cases establish aesthetic enjoyment as a judicially protectible in-
terest of the riparian owner, a position easily justified in a state in
which a glance at the Sunday newspaper finds "Florida living"
equated with water-front ownership. Although none of the cases
decided so far have involved lakes, there seems no basis for dis-
-.05Duval Engr. and Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954) (St.
Johns River).
2 06See Hunt, supra note 170 at 400, suggesting that damnum absque injuria
might have been the basis for the decision.
2O7Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957).
20sDeering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928); Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A.
Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918).
209Tampa So. R.R. v. Nettles, 82 Fla. 2, 89 So. 223 (1921); Duval Engr. and
Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954). See also Weir v. Palm Beach
County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956), recognizing the right of view across a public road
but holding it subordinate to the right of the public to have the way improved
to meet the demands of public convenience and necessity.
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tinguishing between an owner on a navigable lake and on a navigable
stream, bay, or ocean.
Lake Levels
An owner of land bordering on a navigable lake may wish to raise
or lower the lake from its ordinary level for any number of reasons. 210
Another owner on the same lake may desire to have it maintained
at its old level, or raised or lowered in a direction opposite to the
first. Moreover, quite often damaging fluctuations in lake levels may
be caused by natural conditions. In one Florida county a large lake
has several streams flowing into it and one stream flowing out of it.
The lake alternates between periods of flooding and periods of very
low levels. During flood periods adjoining crop lands are inundated,
while during dry periods the fishing industry is seriously curtailed.211
Water level control is not currently practiced, although undoubtedly
much of the difficulty could be alleviated by employment of ap-
propriate controls. On the other hand, overcontrol can cause prob-
lems; in some areas conflicts have arisen over control of local water
levels by governmental agencies representing conflicting interests.212
Generally speaking, the right of the riparian owner on a lake to
have the lake maintained at its ordinary level is similar to the right
of a riparian owner on a navigable watercourse to have the flow of
the stream maintained. Both rights are well recognized,213 but
21oE.g., a landowner on a large shallow lake in Hernando County dug a
drainage well for the purpose of lowering the lake level and thus providing more
pasture land. In dry periods the lake level goes so low that a fish camp operator
on the other side of the lake is left high and dry, and the volume of water for
fish reproduction is seriously reduced. See FLORIDA WATER RESOURCES STUDY
COMM'N, REPORT OF COUNTY COMIIITTEES ON WATER PROBLEMS §I1.D.1 (1956). In
Marion County a large lake in the vicinity of several developed citrus groves was
drained. The loss of the water surface as a temperature control resulted in con-
siderably increased frost damage to the groves during subsequent cold snaps. Ibid.
211Id. §I.D.1 (Marion County).
21l2bid. (Palm Beach County). The recently created Department of Water
Resources may provide a means for resolving such conflicts. See FLA. STAT.
§§373.141,.171 (1959). The Department has recently acted as coordinator and
adviser for the several agencies involved in controlling the level of Lake Tsala
Apopka. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, FIRST BIENNIAL REP. 23 (1959).
2
'3See 2 FARNHAM §§475-77, 477a; 1 FARNHAM 405, n.16; accord, Taylor v.
Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950). But see State v. Sunapee Dam Co., 70
N.H. 458 (1900) (state can authorize lowering level of lake without providing
compensation to riparian owners); cf. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274
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neither precludes other riparian owners from making reasonable
use of the water.214 While a riparian owner may be entitled to pre-
vent another riparian from unreasonably lowering a lake, the fact
that the lake is considerably below its normal level will not always
support an injunction against a riparian owner's withdrawing water
for irrigation. If it is shown that the low level is from causes other
than the irrigator's pumping, the use may not be found to be un-
reasonable.215
When a lake is above its ordinary level, a riparian owner de-
sirous of having the lake level remain above normal will not be
granted an injunction against other riparian owners whose lands
are flooded and who plan to drain off the excess water.2 6 A Florida
statute217 that makes it unlawful to lower the level of a lake of greater
area than two square miles without obtaining the written consent of
all owners of property abutting on a lake will not alter this result.
The Florida Supreme Court has concluded that the statute was not
intended to prolong abnormal and unusual conditions, but was in-
tended to prevent a lowering of the normal level of the lake over
the objection of the abutting owners.218
In addition to actions by individuals, various governmental
agencies may be involved in controlling lake levels in Florida. The
federal government may exercise regulatory control through the
Corps of Engineers or the Secretary of Agriculture. The State of
Florida may act through the Department of Water Resources or water
control districts. The Corps of Engineers can exercise regulatory
authority to protect navigation or provide for flood control. Control
of lake levels throughout the Tennessee Valley supplies a large
scale example of the use of federal power. 21 9 Once this authority
was established, it was a simple matter to extend it to development of
(1927).
214See note 213 supra. See also Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, 102 So.2d
833 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (Lake Gibson).
2l5Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, supra note 214.
21OTilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 113 So. 708 (1927) (Lake Johns).
217FLA. STAT. §298.74 (1959).
218"This word [level] as used in the statute does not mean the abnormally
low level of a lake during one of a series of excessively dry years, or the ab-
normally high level of a lake during an excessively wet year or series of wet years,
but the average of mean level obtaining under fairly normal or average weather
conditions, allowing the proper range between high and low water mark in
average years." Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 512, 113 So. 708, 712 (1927).
2lAshwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1935).
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water power, as long as improvement of navigation was even remotely
involved.2 2-  An example of the control of lake levels in Florida
by the Corps of Engineers is Lake Okeechobee, the level of which
is constantly regulated by the Corps. 2 2 1
Congress has further extended its flood control jurisdiction to
include "measures for run-off and water-flow retardation and soil
erosion prevention on watersheds222 contributing in any way to the
control of navigable waters. Implementation of this power through
the 1954 Water Protection and Flood Prevention Act, commonly
known as the Small Watershed Act,223 opens the door for possible
federal participation in control of lake levels in numerous Florida
lakes.-2 4
Several state agencies also have varying degrees of authority to
control lake levels. The Department of Water Resources of the
State Board of Conservation may be involved in two ways. The
Board, acting on the advice of the Department, has statu-
tory power to authorize the capture of water in watercourses in
excess of average minimum flow and can thus control the use of such
water to increase or maintain lake levels.225 It also can authorize the
use of water from lakes in excess of average minimum level;226 this
could result in lowering lakes to that level. Furthermore it has the
2 2OGreen Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 90 Wis. 370,
61 N.W. 1121 (1895), rev'd sub norn. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patton
Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58 (1898) (federal authority upheld despite statement of the
state court that only 1% of the stream was required for navigation and remaining
99% was used for power).
22lThus in 1956, at the height of a lengthy drought, the Corps notified the
Central & Southern Florida Flood Control District that if a minimum lake level
should be reached, no more water would be released from the lake for irrigation
in the district, since this minimum was considered necessary to protect navigation
in the cross-state canal system.
22249 STAT. 1570 (1936), 33 U.S.C. §701b (1958).
22368 STAT. 666 (1954), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §701 (b) (1958).
2 24See Dovell and Tarlton, The Watershed Act: Its Application to Florida, 15
ECONOMIC LEAFLETS No. 2 (U. of Fla., Feb. 1956). For a report on the current
status of small watershed projects in Florida, see FLORIDA DEP'T OF WATER RE-
SOURCES, FIRST BIENNIAL REP. 25, 26 (1959).
225FLA. STAT. §373.141 (1) (a) (1959). Such authority could be used, e.g., to
bolster the action of the Tsala Apopka Basin Recreation and Water Conservation
and Control Authority in establishing an inlet to Lake Tsala Apopka from the
Withlacoochee River to divert water into the lake whenever the river is at normal
or higher stages. See FLORIDA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, FIRST BIENNIAL REP. 23
(1959).
2 26FLA. STAT. §373.141 (1) (a) (1959).
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power to authorize the governing board of any legally constituted
water management district to perform these activities.27
In addition to being involved in the controlling of lake levels
with respect to excess water, the Board has authority to aid
in the conservation of lake water in critical areas through the es-
tablishment of water development and conservation districts. It may
also promulgate necessary rules and regulations to govern the con-
servation and use of the water resources of the districts. 228 The De-
partment, however, has not yet found it necessary to invoke this
power.
The Florida legislature has specifically authorized the Central
and Southern Florida Flood Control District 229 and a number of
smaller water control districts230 to regulate lake levels. A number of
the latter districts are already engaged in this activity, and others
are planning to enter this field in the near future.23 1
Assuming that an authorized governmental agency changes the
level of a navigable lake to the determent of riparian owners, do the
owners have a basis for complaint? A lake level may be either raised
or lowered, and lake level control may also result in increasing or
decreasing the flow in the watercourse exiting from it.
If a federal agency controls the lake level and the change can be
connected in some way with the improvement of navigation, or with
flood control, there will be no federal liability so long as the change
does not involve the flooding of land above the ordinary high-water
mark.2 32 However, an increase in elevation that results in the flooding
227FLA. STAT. §373.141 (1) (b) (1959).
228FLA. STAT. § §373.141 (2),.171 (1959).
229FLA. STAT. §387.01 (3) (1959).
23OAlachua County Recreation & Water Conservation & Control Auth., Fla.
Spec. Acts 1957, ch. 57-1119, §12; Dead Lakes Comm'n, Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c.
30786, §3; Lake Apopka Recreation & Water Conservation & Control Auth., Fla.
Spec. Acts. 1953, ch. 28315, §11; Oklawaha Basin Recreation & Water Conservation
& Control Auth., Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, ch. 29222, §§12, 13; Pinellas County Water
& Navig. Control Auth., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, ch. 31182, §2; Tsala Apopka Basin
Recreation & Water Conservation Control Auth., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, ch. 30653,
§12, as amended, Fla. Spec. Acts 1957, ch. 57-1223, §§12, 13; Winter Haven Lake
Region Boat Course Dist., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, ch. 31189, §1.
231See FLORIDA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, FIRsT BIENNIAL REP. 21-24 (1959).
232This proposition is well established for navigable streams. United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S.
269 (1897). It has been applied to deny compensation for alleged flooding of
islands in Lake Okeechobee. Creech v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 301 (1944),
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of land above the ordinary high-water mark may constitute a taking
that will give rise to an implied contract to pay just compensation
under the fifth amendment.233 If, on the other hand, control results
in changing the flow of a stream draining a lake, the United States
seemingly will be immune from liability for destruction of private
interests -34 unless the injury was caused by flooding beyond the ordi-
nary high-water mark.
If a state agency controls the lake level, since the state holds title
to the beds of navigable lakes to the high-water mark 235 the agency
should be able to raise the level to that height without incurring
liability. Any elevation above that level would constitute a trespass
by flooding of riparian lands. Although a riparian owner could not
sue the state in tort for damages for such a trespass, 36 he presumably
could through injunctive proceedings require the state either to
reduce the level to the ordinary high-water mark or provide compen-
sation for the "taking" of his land through institution of an eminent
domain proceeding.2 37
If water control action by a state agency should result in lower-
ing the level of a navigable lake or an outlet stream, would the
state be liable for harm to riparian owners? Presumably not, if the
control measures could be shown to be reasonably necessary in the
public interest for the conservation of the water resources of the
state. In such a case the injury would not constitute a "taking" of
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 870 (1945).
233Creech v. United States, supra note 232 (by implication). Flooding of land
in and adjacent to non-navigable tributary streams as a result of navigation
improvements has been definitely held to be compensable. United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917). For a discussion of the possible measure of damages in such
cases, see Lassiter & McPherson, Methods of Compensating Land Owners for
Damages Attributed to Public Control of Vater Levels: A Case Study of the
Islands in Lake Okeechobee, Florida, 34 LAND EcoNomics 37 (1958).
2 3 48ee 3 U. S. PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, WATER RESOURCES
LAW 25-29 (1950), and cases cited therein.
235Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing & Constr. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 96
(1946); Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1945); Caples v. Taliaferro,
144 Fla. 1, 197 So. 861 (1940).
2 36 Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So.2d 406, 409 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
237State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, I So.2d 868 (1941) (state required
to remove fill which raised level of watercourse above normal, reducing fall in
plaintiff's mill race, or exercise eminent domain power); accord, Broward County
v. Bouldin, 114 So.2d 757 (1959) (usurpation of complainant's land for use as
public road); State Road Dep't v. Darby, 109 So.2d 591 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959)
(washing of fill into complainant's land by diffused surface water).
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real property, as in the flooding cases; and the deprivation of riparian
usufructuary privileges, if overbalanced by the public benefits from
conservation measures, could probably be justified as an exercise of
the police power in the general welfare.238
If the control measures were held to be unreasonable, the agency
presumably could be required by injunction to make reasonable
adjustments in the level,239 even though it would, as an instrumen-
tality of the state, be immune from damages for the injury to the
riparian.240 Finally, a riparian would not be able to rely on the
statute prohibiting the lowering of lakes of greater area than two
square miles without the consent of all abutting owners, since that
statute applies to "persons" and to state agencies. 241 Moreover, this
statute was enacted in 1915, long prior to the acts authorizing the
various agencies to regulate lake levels,2 42 so that these later acts
would take precedence.243
b. Consumptive Uses
Florida's lakes, and her streams for that matter, have not been
looked upon as a source of water supply by major consumptive users
of water. Ground water sources have been abundant and easily
tapped. A recent study244 indicates that in 1956 only fourteen per
cent of all domestic consumption, both rural and urban, came from
surface water supplies. A few of the less populous counties245 did
utilize surface water sources, and two larger counties246 utilized
substantial quantities of both ground and surface water. It is esti-
238A similar argument in justification of the blocking of navigation on a
Florida stream by a salt water intrusion dam was upheld in Carmazi v. Board of
Comm'rs, 104 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1958). (For detailed discussion of that case see pp.
[19-22]supra.) See also Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956),
denying relief on similar grounds for interference with rights of ingress, egress,
and view resulting from improvement of a public road.
23Cf. cases cited note 237 supra.
240Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So.2d 406, 409 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
241FLA. STAT. §298.74 (1959).
242See note 230 supra.
24SAnglin v. Mayo, 88 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1956); De Coningh v. City of Daytona
Beach, 103 So.2d 233 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Or. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 057-287, Sept.
17, 1957).
244FLORIDA WATER RESOURCES STUDY COM'N PRELIMINARY REP. OF COMM. ON
WATER UsE 3 (1956).
24lCharlotte, Okeechobee, St. Lucie.
246Hillsborough, Palm Beach.
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mated that by 1970 less than ten per cent of the approximately 791
million gallons per day needed for domestic consumption - an in-
crease of about 100 per cent over the 378 million gallons per day
used in 1956 - will come from the surface water supplies.247
The story of agricultural and industrial uses is the same. Water
for irrigation of citrus groves comes almost exclusively from ground
water sources. The mining industry takes approximately three fourths
of its water from the ground, and the chemical and pulp plants'
consumption is about fifty per cent from surface water and fifty per
cent from ground water sources.2 48
Florida's water law with respect to consumptive uses has gen-
erally developed within the confines of the riparian system. The
earliest cases, usually involving watercourses, put primary emphasis
on the right of the riparian owner to use the water for domestic and
household purposes, including the watering of farm animals; and
these uses were generally referred to as "natural" uses, as distin-
guished from "artificial" uses, such as for irrigation and manufac-
turing. As a general rule the riparian owner was permitted to use
such water as was necessary for his natural uses regardless of the
effect on lower owners on the watercourse. On the other hand, he
could not use the water for artificial purposes if it would interfere
with the flow to the lower owners. The reasonableness of the use
was not a consideration.249 In some states there is a trend toward
de-emphasizing the distinction between natural and artificial uses
and recognizing in riparian owners a common right in water, with
each owner entitled to make such natural or artificial use of the water
as is reasonable under the circumstances with regard to the uses of
the other riparian owners. Although this change in conceptual ap-
proach provides no answers, it perhaps makes the machinery for
solution more flexible.
As indicated in an earlier article, 05 0 the state of development of
the Florida law with respect to withdrawal for consumptive uses is
not too clear. In the early case of Tampa Waterworks v. Cline251
the Supreme Court of Florida, dealing with the pollution of an under-
ground stream that was used as a source of water supply by the
247See note 244 supra at 8.
248ld. at 8-23.
249See Maloney, Florida's New Water Law, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 125, 128, n.40
(1957); Maloney and Plager, Florida's Streams, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 294 (1957).
250Maloncy and Plager, supra note 249, at 305.
25137 Fla. 586, 595, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896) (dictum).
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City of Tampa, restated the riparian rule with the reasonable use
modification. Since the case dealt with pollution, it did not estab-
lish a binding precedent concerning consumptive use. The decision
indicated, however, that when the problem was dearly presented to
the Court it would probably adopt the reasonable use aspect of the
riparian doctrine and permit diversions that did not unreasonably in-
terfere with use by other riparian owners. In Taylor v. Tampa Coal
Co. the problem did come before the Court, but the setting was a
twenty-six acre lake that was deemed non-navigable. The Court
stated:252
"Except as to the supplying of natural wants, including the
use of the water for domestic purposes for house or farm, such
as .drinking, washing, cooking, or for stock of the proprietor,
each riparian owner has the right to use the water in the lake
for all lawful purposes, so long as his use of the water is not
detrimental to the rights of other riparian owners .. "
The facts indicated that the withdrawals being made by one of the
owners of the lake for irrigation of his citrus grove were materially
lowering the lake level, to the detriment of the recreational use being
made by one of the other owners, and an injunction limiting with-
drawals was affirmed.
In a 1958 case 252 involving withdrawals for irrigation by an owner
on a 485-acre non-meandered lake the Second District Court of Appeal,
without taking a position as to the navigability of the lake, cited
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co. as controlling. However, on the facts it
was deemed that the defendant's use was not causing an unreasonable
interference with other owners' uses, and an injunction granted by
the lower court was reversed.
In times of water shortage all of the interests competing for
the available supply insist that theirs is a use that should be the
last to be curtailed. In those areas of the state where lakes provide
an important source of water supply, the recent dry years created
many conflicts between competing owners.2 54 Presumably domestic
25246 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1950).
253Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, 102 So.2d 833 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
254See FLORIDA WATER REsOURCES STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF COUNTY CoMx-
MITIEES ON WATER PROBLEMS (1956) §II.A.6 at 11 (Citrus County), 36 (Highlands
and Hillsborough counties), 43 (Lake County), 46 (Leon County), 66 (Pasco
County).
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users would have first priority, as they did under the strict riparian
system. Once that use was satisfied, the other users would have
to share the remaining supply in such fashion as was reasonable
under all of the circumstances. Since circumstances would vary from
case to case, a final decision on reasonableness as between competing
users would rest with the courts. In the event that a water develop-
ment and conservation district should be created for the critical
area under the provisions of the 1957 Water Resources Law,2-5 an
administrative decision concerning the reasonableness of proposed
withdrawals might resolve the problem. Such a decision, of course,
would be subject to review by the courts. -8
Can a municipality claim the benefits of riparian ownership to
the extent of withdrawing sufficient quantities of water from a lake
to supply its inhabitants, with perhaps the advantage of priority in
times of shortage that domestic users ordinarily could claim? A
number of Florida cities have experienced salt water intrusion to
such an extent that local ground water supplies have become un-
usable,25- and the cities have gone inland in search of new sources
of water. When a city purchases a piece of land bordering a water-
course or lake that is outside its limits and attempts to divert water
from it to supply the needs of its people, the courts have not had
much difficulty in finding the use unlawful when other riparian
owners are injured as a result of the withdrawals. The rationale
for such a decision can be that a riparian is not entitled to transport
the water beyond his riparian lands, 258 or simply that such a use is
unreasonable in relation to the other riparian owners. 259
It was successfully argued in an early Ohio case 26 0 in which the
water supply was within the city's territorial limits that a city is en-
titled to the privileges of riparian status, including withdrawal of
water for municipal purposes. The court concluded that a city lo-
cated on a stream could draw water for the domestic uses of its in-
habitants in the same fashion as any other riparian. With reference
to water used for power purposes within the city, the rule of reason-
25-FLA. STAT. §373.141 (1959).
25(6See Maloney and Plager, supra note 249 at 146-50.
257See Black, Brown, and Pearce, Salt Water Intrusion in Florida, in FLORIDA
STATE BOARD OF CONSERVATION, WATER SURVEY AND RESEARCH PAPER No. 9 (1953).
25SSee Elkhart v. Christiana Hydraulics, 223 Ind. 242, 59 N.E.2d 353 (1945).
See also Maloney and Plager, supra note 249 at 306.
259See Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854); 56 AM. JUR., Water §345 (1947).
26OCity of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902).
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able use was applied. Only as to water transported beyond the
corporate limits of the city did the court prohibit the city from
making withdrawals. North Carolina 2o and Virginia 262 have more
recently reached the opposite conclusion, largely on the ground that
the concept of riparian status contemplates an individual or a family,
or perhaps a business, located in close proximity to the body of
water involved, and does not include a sprawling city with thousands
of inhabitants.23 It should be noted that such decisions do not
necessarily leave the city without recourse, since the power of
eminent domain will usually be available as a technique for acquir-
ing a water source, although its use will necessitate compensation to
those whose property is taken in the process.264
RIGHTs OF THE PUBLIC
The establishment of navigability is presently the foundation of
public rights in Florida's lakes, as in her streams. 265  The nature
and extent of such rights, however, particularly those involving non-
consumptive uses of the water, have received very little judicial or
legislative consideration.
There are a number of interrelated problems involved in non-
consumptive uses of Florida's navigable lakes, whether these uses are
recreational or commercial. Foremost among them are the avail-
ability of means of access and the right to go along the shore after
access to a lake has been gained. These rights will be considered first
and then the right, assuming access has been gained, to various
recreational uses, including boating, bathing, hunting, fishing, and
scenic enjoyment. Finally, the right to derive commercial benefit from
such non-consumptive uses as boating, bathing, and fishing and the
power of public authorities to exploit such uses through leases and
other means, will be assessed.
201Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941).
202Town of Purcheliville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
203Cf. Salem Flouring Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Ore. 82, 69 Pac. 1033 (1902)
(denying to the state the riparian right to supply the domestic water needs of
1800 to 1500 inmates of a penitentiary and asylum from a nearby water source).
For a more extended treatment of the subject see Ziegler, Acquisition and Pro-
tection of Water Supplies for Municipalities, 57 MICH. L. Rv. 349 (1959).
264E.g., FLA. STAT. §361.04 (1959).
-25ee "Navigability and Public Rights," Pt. I supra.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW
Access
The mere fact that a lake is navigable does not guarantee public
access to it. As more and more lakeshore property passes into private
ownership, the problem of access becomes more and more acute. 26
The courts are generally agreed that members of the public have no
right to cross private property to reach navigable waters. 26 7 The
Florida trespass statute268 seemingly dictates a similar result. Even
when the shore was originally owned by the state and later sold into
private ownership it has been argued that there was an implied reser-
vation of a way of necessity for public access. This has been rejected
as inapplicable when the original unity of title essential to the
establishment of an easement of necessity is found only in the state.
269
Can the state enact legislation authorizing the crossing of private
lands to gain access to public lakes? One such statute was held un-
constitutional because no provision was made for compensation of
private landowners..2 70  The Wisconsin legislature has recently au-
thorized the state to exercise its power of eminent domain to gain
public access to navigable lakes.2 7 1 If a lake is non-navigable and
266Figurcs on the number of Wisconsin lakes without means of public access
are collected in Vaite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solu-
tion, 1958 Wis. L. Ri:v. 542, 543. For a popular article pointing up the critical
nature of the access problem in Florida, see All Florida Weekly Magazine, Dec.
7, 1958, p. 8.
2 67See 1 FARNHAM 654; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1191, 1191-99, (1928), citing Cal.,
Miss., Mass., Wash., and N.Y. cases.
2 6 8FLA. STAT. ch. 821 (1959).
acState v. Black Bros., 116 Tex. 615, 297 S.W. 213 (1927); see 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §793 (3d ed. 1939).
27Vt. Acts of 1892, No. 80; New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mathews,
68 Vt. 338, 35 At. 323 (1896). The court indicated that even if compensation
were authorized the statute would still be unconstitutional, since it provided
for taking of private property for private use. But since individuals could be
claiming access under a public right, this part of the opinion seems questionable.
Since such a taking would be the equivalent of eminent domain proceedings, how-
ever, legislation of this sort, if enacted in Florida, would probably run afoul of
the constitutional guarantee of jury trial in such proceedings. FLA. CONsT. art. 16
§29. But cf. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441 (1882), recognizing the validity
of a Massachusetts colonial ordinance giving members of the public a right to
cross unenclosed woodlands to gain access to great ponds. However, this ordinance
is no longer recognized in Massachusetts itself. Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49
N.E. 1017 (1898).
27IWIs. STAT. §§59.07, 60.18(15), 61.34(3) (1955) (county, town, and village
boards given authority to condemn land for public access to navigable waters and
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completely surrounded by privately owned lands, however, there is
seemingly no right in the public to use it and therefore no basis for a
condemnation proceeding to gain access to it.272
Private owners on a lake may not be alone in their desire to
prevent opening of the lake to the public. Commercial interests
controlling limited means of access may join forces with the ri-
parian.273 But the availability of Florida's lakes to recreational users
can be a source of economic strength to the entire state, for once
public access is available, accommodations for visitors need not be
riparian to cater to their needs successfully. In Wisconsin the power
of the state,27 4 counties,275 and municipalities2 76 to condemn rights of
way for public highways to navigate waters is specifically spelled out.
In addition, a state platting statute requires that when subdivisions are
laid out on land abutting a lake or stream roads must be provided
affording access to the water at not more than one-half-mile intervals
along the shore.277 The 1959 Florida Legislature authorized the
State Road Board to establish access roads to public waters but
specifically denied the Board condemnation powers for this purpose.278
It remains to be seen how effective the new statute will be without
this power.
If a county can obtain land on a navigable lake for a public
park, either by gift or purchase, or possibly even by eminent domain
proceedings, it may then be feasible for the county to exercise its
power of eminent domain to condemn a right of way to the park. In
this way the limitation on the condemnation powers of the State Road
Board could be avoided. The statute granting eminent domain
powers to Florida counties is worded broadly enough to permit such
additional land for recreational purposes).
272Osceola County v. Triple E. Devel. Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956); accord,
Turner v. Selectmen of Hebron, 61 Conn. 175, 22 Atl. 951 (1891).
273E.g., a 1957 Wisconsin bill to authorize condemnation of rights of entry to
navigable lakes was opposed by the Resort Ass'n of Wisconsin as a threat to the
resort industry. See Waite, supra note 266.
274Ws. STAT. §23.11 (2) (1957), applicable when the state conservation com-
mission has riparian lands under its supervision.
275WIs. STAT. §23.09 (14) (1957).
276WIS. STAT. §60.18 (15) (1957).
277WS. STAT. §236.16 (3) (1957), as amended, Wis. Laws 1957, c. 88, §6. For
further discussion see Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable
Waters, 1958 Wis. L. Rxv. 335, 368-71. See also Waite, Land Use Controls and
Recreation in Northern Wisconsin, 42 MARq. L. Rav. 271, 287-94 (1959).
278FLA. STAT. §335.16 (1959).
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a taking.279 However, the issue of whether a park on a lake, or an
access road to such a park, can meet the eminent domain require-
ment of "public necessity"280 has not yet been squarely decided by
the Florida courts. Although the Supreme Court has not found this
necessity in the two cases that have reached it so far,281 a concurring
opinion in one of them indicates that both of these purposes may be
sustained in an appropriate situation.2S2
Passage Along the Shore
If a member of the public has gained access to a navigable lake,
does he have the right to travel along the shore? The answer in
most jurisdictions is "No,"283 based either on the theory that the
riparian owner holds title to the low-water mark and hence has the
right to enjoin "trespassers" between the high-water and low-water
marks,2 1 or on the broader basis that passage is regarded as an inter-
ference with the riparian rights of the owner of the upland, who has
the "exclusive privileges of the shore for the purpose of access to
his land and the water. ' '285
2 7 9
FLA. STAT. §127.01 (1) (1959) authorizes taking for any county purpose, and
§127.01 (2) lists parks, playgrounds, and recreational centers among such purposes.
28OThis requirement is spelled out in the statute. FLA. STAT. §127.01 (2) (1959).
2 8lOsceola County v. Triple E Development Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956) (con-
demnation for a road to privately owned non-navigable lake held not for a
public purpose); Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31
So.2d 483 (1947) (condemnation to create a public hunting and fishing reservation
in a remote area held not a public necessity).
282Drew, J., concurring in Osceola County v. Triple E. Development Co., supra
note 281 at 603, says: "Had the road been condemned for the purpose of reaching
a county park, playground or other public area adjacent to the shores of said
lake or had land been included in the condemnation along the shores of the
lake for some lawful county recreational or public purpose, then I think the
County Commissioners would have been acting clearly within the scope of their
power and such action would have been lawfully taken." See Op. ATT'y GEN.
FLA. 059-183, Sept. 11, 1959.
283E.g., LaVeine v. Stack-Gibbs Lumber Co., 17 Idaho 51, 104 Pac. 666 (1909);
Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor Boom Co., 21
Wash. 542, 58 Pac. 663 (1899), all cases involving use of the shore between high-
water and low-water marks as an incident of floating logs. In Garth Lumber &
Shingle Co. v. Johnson, 151 Mich. 205, 115 N.W. 52 (1908), a statute authorizing
such activity without compensation was declared unconstitutional.
24Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437 (1923) (hunting between high-
water and low-water marks on navigable lake).
285Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393 (1923) (hiker), criticized in
Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L.
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Florida, however, would seem to take a contrary position, based
on the fact that riparian owners on lakes hold title only to the
high-water mark.28 Although no cases were found involving recrea-
tional use of the land between high-water and low-water marks on
lakes, the Florida Court has held that a non-riparian logger could
make use of the shore 'between these marks for the purpose of in-
specting and working on his logs as long as he did not totally ex-
clude the riparian owner from access to the water.28 7 Moreover, a
Florida circuit court has upheld the right of recreational users to
free passage along ocean beaches between the high-water and low-
water marks.2s5
Assuming that the same rule is applicable to lakes, will the Florida
courts recognize any limitation on the right of public use of the
shore? A 1942 Arkansas decision is of interest.2s 9 While recognizing
the right of individual members of the public to use the shore of a
navigable river for beaching of fishing boats, the court refused to
sanction extensive use of the riparian's banks by an adjoining com-
mercial boating and fishing business which supplied boats for hire,
on the ground that such use unreasonably interfered with the owner's
right of access to his property on the river. Such an abuse of the
rights incident to navigation would seem to constitute both a public
and a private nuisance, against which the Florida Court might well
grant injunctive relief, as it has in cases involving nuisances created
by abuse of public highways. 290
Boating
Once on a navigable lake, is a member of the public free to use it
for boating? The answer is clearly "Yes." Leaving aside the point,
Ray. 335, 371-74.
2s6Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 574, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927). The same rule
has been applied to streams. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's
River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909). It has been
linked to the fact that Florida originally belonged to Spain, under whose laws
private ownership extended only to the high-water mark unless otherwise specified
by express grant. See Hunt, Riparian Rights in Florida, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 393
(1955).
287Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' &
Shippers' Ass'n, supra note 286.
28State ex rel. Taylor v. Simberg, 2 Fla. Supp. 178 (1952), State ex reL.
Marsh v. Simberg, 4 Fla. Supp. 85 (1953), discussed in Hunt, supra note 286, at
404-06.
2SgAnderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942).
29oSee Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910)
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
made previously, that availability for recreational boating may itself
establish navigability2 91 the Florida Court has indicated that the
public has the right to use navigable lakes for recreational as well
as commercial boating.292 Other jurisdictions seem unanimous in
finding this right in the public. 93
This is not to say that the use of boats on navigable lakes cannot
be regulated in the interest of public safety and welfare. Indeed,
legislation providing for licensing boats, requiring minimum safety
equipment, and establishing boating safety regulations, was enacted
by the 1959 Florida Legislature. 29 With more than 200,000 motor-
boats in use in Florida today,295 this legislation was long overdue.
Lawless operation of motorboats creates serious hazards to bathers
and other recreational users. The towing of water skiers frequently
increases that hazard.
Although no adjudicated cases were found concerning the right
to ski on navigable waters, this sport is so closely connected with
motorboating that it seems reasonable to assume that the right to
tow skiers is included in the right to boat for pleasure. As in the
case of other rights, however, this practice can be abused; if it is
abused it should be subject to abatement as a private nuisance if it
unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of their rights
by riparian owners,2 6 or as a public nuisance if it creates a hazard
to public safety by endangering bathers. 297 Such an injunction was
recently granted against the operators of a Florida water ski school
on the theory of a public nuisance.25 8 The case is now on appeal to
the Second District Court of Appeal.
Swimming, Fishing, and Hunting
In addition to boating, the public seemingly has a right to use
(granting relief on public nuisance theory); Lutterloh v. Town of Cedar Keys,
15 Fla. 306 (1875) (enjoining as a private nuisance the operation of a combined
jail and swine pen in the middle of public street).
291See "American Definitions of Navigability," Pt. I supra.
292Baker v. State, 87 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1956) (dictum); Hicks v. State, 116 Fla.
603, 156 So. 603 (1934) (by inference).
293See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 569, 577-79 (1958).
294FLA. STAT. c. 371 (1959).
295Florida Times-Union, Jan. 8, 1959, p. 20, col. 1.
25 The principle involved would seem to be similar to the one justifying
injunctive relief in Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942).
29 7See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 569, 594 (1958).
29The case was heard before Spoto, J., 13th Jud. Cir. The opinion is unre-
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navigable lakes in Florida,2 9 9 as elsewhere, 30 0 for bathing or swim-
ming, again no doubt subject to regulation by the state in the interest
of public health. This right is generally mentioned by the courts along
with the right to boat and is placed on an equal footing with it.3°1
Does the fact of navigability carry with it a right for members of
the public to hunt and fish in and over navigable waters? The rights
to hunt and to fish are often discussed together in the cases. Since
no Florida cases dealing with the right to hunt were located, the
right to fish will be treated first, and conclusions concerning the right
to hunt on Florida's lakes will be reached by analogy to the fishing
cases.
Although there are some cases holding that the right to hunt and
fish on navigable waters is an incident of the right to use the waters
for purposes of navigation,30 2 the more widely accepted theory is
that this right inheres in the public because the state holds title to
the underlying land in trust for the public and the common right
of hunting and fishing is incident to such ownership.303 Under this
view the navigation right is a right of passage merely,30 4 and in those
jurisdictions in which land underlying navigable waters is recognized
as being in private ownership, it is the private owners, and not the
public, who have the right to hunt and fish in the waters.3 05 Thus
the right of the public to hunt and to fish in navigable waters is
preserved in Wisconsin because title to such lakes is regarded as
being in the public;3 0 6 but it is not available in the State of Wash-
ported. For a factual account of the controversy see Tampa Tribune, Mar. 6,
1959, p. 17D, col. I.
290Baker v. State, 87 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1956) (dictum).
300E.g., Witke v. State Conservation Comm'n, 244 Iowa 261, 56 N.W2d 582
(1953); Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942); cf. Collins v.
Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926) (upholding right to wade in navi-
gable stream).
301E.g., Nelson v. DeLong, supra note 300; Baker v. State, 98 So.2d 497, 498
(dictum) (Fla. 1956).
302E.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951); Munning-
hoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 39 N.W.2d 712 (1949);
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
3o3State ex rel. Thompson v. Parker, 132 Ark. 316, 200 S.W. 1014 (1917); State
v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947); Nelson v. DeLong,
213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942).
3
o4See 1 FA.NnAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 138 (1904).
3o5See 2 id. at 1366. For cases recognizing a public right to fish even though
the underlying land is privately owned see note 307 infra.
30ODiana Shooting Club v. Husting, supra note 302 (hunting); Willow River
Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898) (fishing).
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ington, which regards the public as having only an easement for
navigation, so that the taking of fish would be a trespass against the
riparian proprietor.3°7
The Florida Court has recognized the existence of a right in the
public to fish in navigable lakeso ° 8 It has not, however, indicated
whether this right exists as an incident of navigation or as a separate
right stemming from the trust under which the state holds title to
lands under navigable lakes. Under the latter view, the right to hunt
over navigable waters, since they overlie sovereignty lands held in
trust for the public, would also seem to be guaranteed. Although
the Florida Supreme Court has not as yet included this right in its
catalogue of the rights of the public in navigable waters, it seems
safe to predict that it will be included if necessary.
Needless to say, the rights both to hunt and to fish are subject
to such conservation regulations as are necessary for the public wel-
fare. In Florida the authority for regulation is specifically spelled
out in the Constitution, which established the Game and Fresh Water
Commission and gave it broad powers in this field.3°9
View
While the right of the public to scenic enjoyment of navigable
waters has not been discussed by the Florida courts, it has been
3o7Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900); accord, State v.
Shannon, 36 Ohio St. 423, 38 Am. Rep. 599 (1881); Winous Point Shooting Club
v. Bodi, 20 Ohio C.C.R. 637 (1895). In several jurisdictions that recognize private
ownership of land under navigable lakes, the right of the public to fish if lawful
access to the lake can be gained is preserved. Mississippi places the right of the
public to fish in such lakes on the ground that fish are ferae naturae and there-
fore are not subject to private ownership. See State Game and Fish Comm'n v.
Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940). And Michigan differentiates be-
tween the right to hunt and trap, which is reserved to the riparian, Johnson
v. Burghorn, 212 Mich. 19, 179 N.W. 225 (1920); Sterling v. Jackson, 69 Mich.
488, 37 N.W. 845 (1888), and the right to fish, which the Michigan Supreme
Court regards as held in trust by the state for members of the public as long as
the lake is navigable. Rushton ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432, 11
N.W.2d 193 (1943); Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1927).
3osHicks v. State, 116 Fla. 603, 606, 156 So. 603, 604 (1934) (dictum). For a
similar statement as to navigable rivers, see Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909).
3oSFLA. CONST. art. IV, §30. Implementing legislation is found in FLA. STAT.
ch. 372 (1959). Fish in salt water lakes have been legislatively declared to be the
property of the state and subject to its control. FLA. STAT. §370.10 (1) (1959).
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recognized in at least one American jurisdiction as entitled to pro-
tection under the trust doctrine, along with boating, fishing, swim-
ming, and hunting.310 But recognition by the Florida courts that
there may be a protectible interest in view in riparian owners on
navigable waters may point the way to acknowledgement of a similar
right in the public.311 Even if such a right is recognized, however,
it will have to be weighed against other public interests; and unless
the impairment is substantial it will probably not be looked upon
as a sufficiently serious violation of the trust to warrant judicial
intervention.312
RIGHTS OF COMMERCIAL USERS
Non-consumptive Uses
Non-consumptive commercial uses of Florida's navigable lakes
fall into two categories: commercial navigation, including the renting
of pleasure boats; and commercial fishing and hunting, which are
consumptive of one type of natural resource, fish and game, but non-
consumptive in the sense that neither the water nor the bed of the
lake is consumed.
In so far as commercial boating is concerned, Florida is in accord
with other jurisdictions in that a riparian owner on a navigable lake
not only has a right of access himself but can make his means of
access available to the public on a commercial basis if he wishes.31 3
Moreover, the state may lease public land to an individual for the
purpose of providing boat landings and bathhouses for use by the
public. 314
Of course, if the members of the public using this means of access
so conduct themselves as to constitute a nuisance, for example,
through unreasonable operation of boats315 or through creating haz-
3
'oState v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957); Muench
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 *is. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
3ilSee subheading "View" under "Rights of Riparian Owners," Pt. II supra.
3 12 State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note 310; cf. Tampa So. R.R. v. Nettles,
82 Fla. 2, 89 So. 223 (1921); Duval Engr. and Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d
431 (Fla. 1954).
313Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942); Evans v. Dugan,
205 La. 398, 17 So.2d 562 (1944); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 23
So.2d 756 (1945).
314Hicks ex rel. Landis v. State, 116 Fla. 603, 156 So. 603 (1934).
325Anderson v. Reames, supra note 313; see Forest Land Co. v. Black, infra
note 317 at 263, 57 S.E.2d at 426, suggesting that unreasonable operation of a
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ards to others by uncontrolled water-skiing,316 the nuisance could be
controlled by the riparian owners through the remedy of injunctive
relief
17
In addition, there is the possibility of control through riparian
zoning, particularly if the lake lies wholly or partially within mu-
nicipal limits.318 Such zoning has been held constitutional in the face
of attacks on the ground that it deprives riparians who wish to use
their land for commercial purposes of their property without due
process of law.3 19 It does hold a danger of possible abuse if the
zoning is used to prevent all access by non-riparians to a navigable
lake, but in this case it might well be struck down as arbitrary and
unreasonable in relation to the general welfare of the public.3 -0
Commercial fishing is of two types: fishing on a small scale and
by traditional means, including poles, hand lines, and small nets;
and fishing on a large scale with a view to commercial sale of the
fish. In jurisdictions following the trust theory and recognizing
public ownership of the bottoms of navigable lakes both riparian
owners and members of the public apparently have the right to en-
gage in commercial fishing of both sorts,3 21 as long as it is not done
in such a way as to prevent similar fishing by others and thus es-
tablish an exclusive use by one individual.32 2 This role would seem to
be applicable in Florida, since it has adopted the trust approach.
motorboat would be enjoinable as a nuisance.
316See note 298 supra.
3'17t must be remembered that there is considerable judicial reluctance to
use the rather stringent remedy of injunction, at least to abate totally uses that,
if controlled, may not be legally objectionable. See Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216
S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420 (1950). See also a recent unreported Florida case discussed
in Tampa Tribune, Mar. 6, 1959, p. 17D, col. 1. But controlling the use by this
means will give riparian owners all the relief to which they are legally entitled,
consistent with the rights of the public to enjoy navigable lakes for recreational
purposes.
3lSSee Comment, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
117, 135-41.
"19Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 64 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1946), aLf'd, 156
F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946); Poneleit v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954);
Wicen v. Oconomowac Fishermen's League, Cir. Ct. Waukesha County, Wis., No.
9142 (1958), currently on appeal to Wis. Sup. Ct.
32oState ex rel. Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930); BARTLEY and
BOYER, MUNICIPAL ZONING 25-26 (1950) (U. of Fla. Studies in Pub. Adm'n No. 6).
32'Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942); Small v. Wallace,
124 Me. 365, 129 At. 444 (1925).
322Johnson v. Jeldness, 85 Ore. 657, 167 Pac. 798 (1917); see Eagle Cliff Fishing
Co. v. McGowan, 70 Ore. 1, 137 Pac. 766, dismissed without opinion, 248 U.S. 589
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Statutory provisions for licensing commercial fishing in Florida's
lakes are consonant with this theory.3 23
In jurisdictions in which riparian owners hold title to the bot-
toms of navigable lakes, on the other hand, while a riparian owner
may not be able to object to small scale fishing as in incident to the
easement of navigation, even when done commercially, 324 he may be
entitled to enjoin large scale commercial fishing operations over his
bottom lands as a violation of his property rights. 325 Arguably a
riparian owner who holds title to part of the bed of a navigable lake
by virtue of a Spanish grant should have similar power to prevent
large scale commercial fishing over his land.
Consumptive Uses
Consumptive commercial uses with respect to navigable lakes fall
into two categories: consumptive use of the water, and uses that are
consumptive of mineral deposits underlying the lake or of substances
on the bed, such as sponges, crustaceans, or even cypress trees.
The legal doctrines governing consumptive use of water by ri-
parians are discussed in detail in the section dealing with rights of
riparian owners.326 The right of the state to authorize withdrawals
of water from lakes for consumptive uses is likewise dealt with in
the section concerning lake levels. 327
Turning to the second type of consumptive use, can the state,
consistent with the trust doctrine under which it holds title to the
bottoms of navigable lakes in trust for the people, authorize the
taking of minerals or other substances from the bottoms of Florida's
navigable lakes? The Supreme Court of Florida has avoided the logi-
cal cul-de-sac into which the Supreme Court of Minnesota has fallen.
That court in a 1914 case,3 2 8 while denying a riparian owner the
right to take minerals from the bed of a navigable lake in front of
his uplands, at the same time denied the right of the state to recover
(1914).
323FLA. STAT. §§372.63-.64 (fresh water licenses), §370.06 (salt water licenses)
(1959).
324State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 542, 193 So.
9, 11 (1940) (dictum).
325Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.V.2d 462 (1953); State Game & Fish
Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940).
S26See pp. [55-60] supra.
32 7See pp. [52-55] supra.
328State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914).
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the value of minerals already taken. The decision was taken to mean
that the state, because it held the title to the bed in trust, could not
take or authorize the taking of minerals without violating the trust.329
The final result has been a recent restrictive redefinition of naviga-
bility in terms of actual use for commerce at the time the state
entered the union.330 This redefinition will make the bottoms of
many Minnesota lakes available for mining by riparians, but at the
expense of depriving the public of rights of navigation previously
recognized under a more liberal definition of navigability that in-
cluded boating for recreational purposes.3 31
The Florida Court very early interpreted its trust doctrine as
denying a riparian the ownership of minerals in a navigable river
bottom adjacent to his uplands,332 but as permitting the state as
owner to authorize the taking of the minerals as long as mining
operations did not interfere with public rights incident to naviga-
tion.33 3 In other words, as long as the state sees to the protection of
the public rights of "passage and navigation and fishing,''334 the
residuary rights of the state to develop minerals and other products
of the bed can be utilized to raise revenue for the purposes of govern-
ment. The logic of these early Florida cases has been approved and
adopted in other "trust theory" states. 3 5  Applying this doctrine,
329See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-The Trust Theory, 2
MINN. L. REV. 429, 446 (1918). For additional criticism of the Korrer case see
Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L.
REV. 313 (1918). But see Schaller v. Town of Florence, 193 Minn. 604, 613, 259
N.W. 529, 534 (1935) (dictum).
33oState v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1958).
33 lLamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893). For many years this
decision was cited in other jurisdictions as the leading case protecting public
rights through a liberal definition of navigability. See, e.g., Luscher v. Reynolds,
153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
332State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). The Court
held that the Riparian Act of 1856 did not give a riparian owner the right to
take phosphates from the bed of a navigable stream, since the act transferred title
to such land only when it was filled and improved out to the point of practicable
navigability.
333State v. Black River Phosphate Co., supra note 332; State v. Board of
Phosphate Comm'rs, 31 Fla. 558, 12 So. 913 (1893).
334State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 92, 13 So. 640, 643 (1893);
Trustees of Internal Improv. Fund v. Coastal Petroleum Co. (No. A-359, 1st
D.C.A. Fla., Jan. 19, 1960) (dictum).
333E.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 Pac. 797 (1928); Desert Livestock
Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946); Campbell Brown and Co. v.
Elkins, 131 IV. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248 (1956).
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the Florida legislature has authorized the sale by the Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Fund of minerals and timber under navi-
gable waters of the state,336 as well as the sale or leasing of the
right to drill for petroleum and natural gas.33 7 The right of the
state to execute such leases was confirmed by the courts in the 1945
case of Watson v. Holland,3 3 8 in which the Florida Court distinguished
between disposing of navigable water bottoms, which would violate
the trust, and "the leasing and disposition of substances which it [the
legislature] hoped might be derived from such water bottoms for the
benefit of all the people of this State.."339
In the exercise of this same power the legislature has authorized
the State Board of Conservation to lease navigable salt water bottoms
for the purpose of growing oysters or clams. 340 Such leases are like-
wise presumably not in violation of the state's trust so long as
navigability is not interfered with.
To date no cases involving the sale or leasing of mineral rights
in the beds of navigable lakes have been decided, but since the
legislation authorizing disposition by the state is sufficiently broad
to include these rights, 342 there is no reason to doubt its validity in
relation to such lakes.
PART III. RIGHTS ATRIBUTABLE TO NON-NAVIGABLE LAKES
A determination that a lake is non-navigable generally excludes
the public from the use of the lake.3 4 2 If the bed of a non-navigable
336FLA. STAT. §253.45 (1959); OP. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 042-138, p. 361 (1941-42).
337F_ A. STAT. §253.47 (1959).
338155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1945); accord, Trustees of Internal Improv. Fund
v. Coastal Petroleum Co., supra note 334 (construing lease as including mineral
rights).
3391d. at 350, 20 So.2d at 393.
349FLA. STAT. §370.16 (1959).
341FLA. STAT. §253.45 (1959) includes all state owned lands other than hard-
surfaced beaches and contiguous areas to a mean low water depth of three feet;
and §253.47, providing for petroleum leases, specifically includes the bottoms of
state owned lakes.
a
4 2Compare Baker v. State, 87 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1956) (member of public
claimed right to boat and fish; the issue was whether the part of Lake lamonia
involved was in fact navigable), with Triple E. Devel. Co. v. Osceola County, 6
Fla. Supp. 49 (1954), aff'd, 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956) (county attempted to build
public roads to two 500-acre lakes but made fatal concession that the lakes were
non-navigable). See also Feig v. Graves, 100 So.2d 192 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (in
absence of any evidence in the record the court would treat the lake as non-
navigable).
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lake is entirely owned by one individual, he apparently can use the
lake as he would any other piece of realty, including filling it in
and building on it. This is true even though there may be others
who own land abutting on the lake; the concept of riparian rights
accruing to an individual by virtue of his ownership of land abutting
on a navigable lake has no applicability to the non-navigable lake.
When two or more individuals own portions of the bed of a
non-navigable lake, the courts have not agreed on whether each owner
can make reasonable use of the entire lake, or whether each is con-
fined to his own portion. The so-called common law rule permits an
owner to exclude others entirely from his part of the bed and the
waters over it. 31 3 The civil law rule, on the other hand, permits
each owner to make reasonable use of the entire lake and denies any
owner the right to fill or fence or to otherwise exclude his neigh-
bors. 344 As to the Florida position, the very recent case of Duval v.
Thomas345 has now aligned the state with those jurisdictions holding
that an owner of a portion of the bed of a non-navigable lake cannot
restrict or curtail reasonable enjoyment of the overlying waters by
the other owners of the bed. In so doing the Court recognized the
importance of the state's water resources to its continued development
and growth and the necessity for insuring a maximization of bene-
ficial use. The decision, by rejecting the narrow doctrines of the old
common law and adopting a rule of reasonable use, extends to non-
consumptive uses of non-navigable lakes the reasonable use concept
already applied to consumptive uses of water in non-navigable lakes3 46
- and probably in navigable lakes as well 347 - and to withdrawals of
343See, e.g., Baker v. Normanoch Assoc., Inc., 25 N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957);
Akron Canal and Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio App. 73, 50 N.E.2d 897
(1943); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
344Tobias v. Tobias, 345 Mich. 263, 75 N.W.2d 802 (1956); Beach v. Hanyer,
207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919); Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 195 Va.
317, 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
For a complete collection of cases see Note, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 166, 176-77 (1952).
345114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959), affirming 107 So.2d 148 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
This holding was cited with approval and the Florida Court's view adopted in
the recent case of Johnson v. Seifert, 100 NAV.2d 689 (Minn. 1960), wherein the
common law rule as applied in Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578
(1902), was expressly overruled.
346Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950); see Note, 5 U. FLA.
L. REv. 166 (1952).
3 47See Tampa Waterworks v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 700 (1896), and dis-
cussion at note 251 supra.
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ground water.3 48 It is interesting to note that both the trial court
and the intermediate appellate court invoked the same rule as that
eventually adopted by the Supreme Court.
The decision in Duval v. Thomas makes it clear that the owners
of separate portions of the bed of a non-navigable lake in Florida
have co-equal rights to the use of the entire lake, and the Court has
indicated that this includes boating, bathing, and fishing.3 49
Can these uses be made available to members of the public who,
perhaps for a fee, are invited by an owner of part of the lake to make
use of all of it? There are strong indications in the case that members
of the public may be given access. The Court says:3 50
"We take judicial knowledge of the importance of 'tourism'
to our state. Florida is advertised as a playground, a retreat
from the hurryscurry of the modern world and from the rigors
of northern climes. Fishing and swimming are prominent if
not principal items of the entertainment the stranger expects
to find here. If the enjoyment of non-navigable lakes were to
be curtailed or restricted by a holding that the owner of a
portion of one of them, and his guests, should enjoy the waters
only within the property lines, the damage would be im-
measurable."
If this is interpreted to mean that members of the public may
gain access through an owner of a part of the lake, are there any
limitations on the number that can be invited or on their activities?
The Court answers: [W]e feel free to announce that the body of
water should be available to all owners for use that would not un-
reasonably interfere with rights of the other proprietors."3 51 When
would use by the public become unreasonable? Could hundreds of
people be invited to use the lake? The answer, of course, would
vary with the size of the lake, but a New Jersey stream case is of
interest. The New Jersey court at the request of a lower riparian
owner found it unreasonable to use water from a small non-navigable
stream to provide swimming in an adjacent pond for boys in groups
of seventy.352 A Florida circuit court has recently found the operation
348Koch v. Wick, 87 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1956).
349114 So.2d 791, 793, 795 (Fla. 1959).
3501d. at 795.
351d. at 794.
3152McCord v. Big Brothers Movement, 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 At. 480 (Cha. 1936).
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of a water skiing school on a non-meandered lake to be unreasonable,
while indicating that skiing on a small scale would be permissible.3 53
To what extent can the state regulate the use of a non-navigable
lake? The question has generally arisen in connection with the ap-
plicability of fish and game laws. There is no question as to the
state's right to regulate fishing and hunting in or on navigable public
waters.3 5 4 When the bed of a non-navigable lake is in private owner-
ship, however, the common law laissez-faire philosophy of the
sanctity of private property runs headlong into the state's desire to
conserve its natural resources. 3r5 Little difficulty has been found in
establishing the state's authority to control hunting, even on privately
owned lands. The fact that wild game has little respect for property
lines but moves freely from one man's property to the next has led
the courts to classify wild game as ferae naturae, and to decree that
the mere presence of game on private land does not entitle the owner
of the land to claim ownership of it.356 The owner of the real estate
has the exclusive right to hunt wild game while it is upon his lands;
but until he has reduced it to his possession the state's interest is
superior, and the power to regulate goes with the game. 357
The same general principles have been applied to fish, although
an additional factor is involved. If a lake is entirely surrounded by
land, without connection with other water bodies, passage of fish
in or out of the lake will be effectively cut off. In the absence of such
movement the argument for state control loses its basic premise -
the necessity for regulation of a natural resource that is shared by the
public. The courts have recognized the force of this argument, and
in those cases in which the privately owned lake was found to be in
no way connected with another body of water the state has been
denied the power to regulate. 5s Occasional or intermittent high
water or flooding which permits fish to pass for short periods in or
See also People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 174, 91 N.W. 211, 218 (1902).
353See note 298 supra.
3 54See discussion p. 31-33 supra.
355FLA. STAT. CC. 370, 372 (1959).
356See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Gaines 174 (N.Y. 1805).
357See Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226 (1909); Hamilton v. Williams,
145 Fla. 697, 700, 200 So. 8, 81 (1941) (dictum). See also 2 Am. JUR., Animals §8
(1936).
358E.g., Milton v. State, 144 Ark. 1, 221 S.W. 461 (1920); State v. Biggs, 12
N.J. Misc. 833, 175 At. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934), afl'd, 117 N.J.L. 240, 187 Atl. 199
(1936); see Newman v. Ardmore Rod & Gun Club, 190 Okla. 470, 125 P.2d 191
(1942).
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out of an otherwise landlocked lake has not been enough in the
eyes of the Arkansas359 and Oklahoma36 0 courts to permit state inter-
vention, although Illinois361 and Michigan 2 think otherwise.
Even though the lake and the surrounding land are owned en-
tirely by one individual, he is not relieved from state regulation so
long as there is a passageway through which the fish may travel that
connects with public waters.363 A fortiori, a lake with such an outlet
owned by several individuals is within the reach of the state's laws.
3 6 4
Is ownership of a non-navigable lake by two or more individuals
enough in itself to warrant state control of fishing even though
there may be no connection between the lake and other bodies of
water? State regulation under these circumstances probably could
not be predicated upon protection of the public interest in the fish.
The fact that there is more than one owner entitled to the use of
the lake does not open it to the general public, 65 although it is
clear in Florida that each owner is entitled to fish in the whole
lake.366 In an 1896 Tennessee case an owner of 1,000 acres of a 1,040-
acre lake was convicted of violating a state fishing law applicable to
all lakes or ponds except private ponds.3 67 The court considered the
water body to be outside the term private pond because it was not
owned entirely by one individual. The court did not discuss the
question of connection with other bodies of water, although there
35DArkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. Storthz, 181 Ark. 1089, 29 S.W.2d 294
(1930).
360Washburn v. State, 90 Okla. Grim. 306, 213 P.2d 870 (1950).
36lPeople v. Bridges, 142 Ill. 30, 31 N.E. 115 (1892).
362People v. Horling, 137 Mich. 406, 100 N.W. 691 (1904). See also People v.
Lewis, 227 Mich. 343, 198 N.W. 957 (1924).
363People v. Horling, note 362 supra; see People v. Doxtater, 147 N.Y. 723,
42 N.E. 724 (1894) (memorandum decision).
364See People v. Bridges, supra note 361; Reid v. Ross, 46 S.W.2d 567 (Mo.
1932); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 754 (1959). See also Bannon v. Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63
So. 454 (1913), upholding a conviction of one who was found to own the portion
of the bed of the meandered lake upon which he was fishing in violation of
the state fishing law. Since a portion of the lake was meandered, it was pre-
sumably navigable, at least in part. Even if the petitioner's land underlay a non-
navigable portion of the lake, the fact that the fish could travel from navigable
waters to his portion apparently would make him susceptible to state fishing
regulations.
3658ee p. 67 supra.
366Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959). It is an open question whether
such an owner could allow the public access to the entire lake.
367Peters v. State, 96 Tenn. 682, 36 S.W. 399 (1896).
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was some evidence that the Mississippi River periodically overflowed
into the lake involved.
By statute the State of Florida has declared itself the owner for
the benefit of the people of all fish within the jurisdiction of the
state except those enclosed in privately owned ponds not exceeding
150 acres.3 68 Since the statute is found in the chapter on salt water
fisheries, its operation may well be limited to salt water lakes, 36 9
but at least as to such lakes it raises several interesting possibilities.
Assuming a pond or a lake smaller in size than 150 acres but con-
nected to another water body in which the public has an interest,
does the statute remove the lake from state regulation? The use
in the statute of the term enclosed suggests a basis for limiting the
exception to lakes without any connection with other bodies of
water. Such a construction would be consistent with the general
rule as to connected lakes. But assuming a lake in multiple owner-
ship that is smaller than 150 acres and without an outlet of any kind,
under the statute the fact of such ownership apparently would not
be enough to make the lake the subject of state regulation.
The converse of the above problem-a lake exceeding 150 acres
but non-navigable and without an outlet-raises additional prob-
lems. Whether attempts by the state to regulate fishing on the basis
of this statute would be a taking of private property in violation
of constitutional guarantees is unanswered at present. An attempt
by a member of the public to claim a right to fish in such a lake,
based solely on a state license plus the statutory declaration of state
ownership of the fish, would probably be unsuccessful. In Hamilton
v. Williams37° a hunter convicted of trespassing on privately-owned
posted lands contended that his possession of a state hunting license
authorized him to enter the enclosed area without permission as
long as his entry was peacable and solely for the purpose of hunting
game. The Court found this contention without merit, holding that
a license would in no way justify a trespass upon private lands, since
this would constitute a taking of private property in violation of
constitutional guarantees. The Court stated that although property
in ferae naturae is vested in the state as trustee for all of its citizens,
the owner of real estate has the exclusive right to hunt wild game
3 6 8FLA. STAT. §370.10 (1) (1959).
3 69See discussion of McDowell v. Trustees of Internal Improv. Fund at note
79 supra.
370145 Fla. 697, 200 So. 80 (1941).
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while it is upon his soil, subject to lawful regulation by the state.3 7 1
The right of an owner of all or part of a non-navigable lake to
use the water for swimming has been challenged on a few occasions
by enactment of regulations purporting to prohibit such use as a
necessary step in preserving public water supplies. In Pounds v.
Darling372 the Florida Court declared such an ordinance invalid as
applied to the owner's right to swim in the lake, since it deprived him
of a property right without compensation. The Court stated that the
proper method for acquiring the right to prohibit such use was by
the city's exercise of its power of eminent domain.3 73
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Navigability is often thought of as the fountainhead of public
rights, particularly the rights of recreational users of Florida's rivers
and lakes. The concept is sufficiently broad to make the majority
of Florida's rivers available for recreational use by the public, 37 4 but
historical developments have created serious roadblocks in the way
of recognizing and protecting similar public rights in most of her
estimated 30,000 lakes.
In the original federal survey of the state, the surveyors were
instructed to meander navigable water bottoms. In other states, fol-
lowing instructions from the General Land Office, they meandered
all lakes of more than twenty-five acres in area; but in Florida, for
one reason or another, no more than 190 fresh-water lakes were in
fact meandered. A list of these lakes will be found in an appendix
to this article.
Although failure to meander a lake is not conclusive evidence that
it is non-navigable, it was early assumed by the Trustees of the In-
ternal Improvement Fund that the non-meandered lakes of Florida
were non-navigable and that they had been acquired by the state
under the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850. As a result,
the bottoms of these lakes were not regarded as sovereignty lands,
and over the past century most of them have been conveyed to
private owners.
It has been assumed that once these lakes were conveyed by the
state, public rights of use were lost. This view, however, is contrary
37'See also Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226 (1910).
37275 Fla. 125, 77 So. 666 (1918).
373Accord, People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902); Petition of
Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950).
374Maloney and Plager, Florida's Streams, 10 U. FLA. L. Riv. 294, 329 (1957).
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to the Spanish civil law approach to public use of lakes. Under that
law, which was applicable in Florida at least until 1819, the public
was entitled to use lakes for boating, regardless of whether the bot-
tom was in public or private ownership, as long as the lake was
actually useful for navigation of any sort.
Any approach to public use through navigability begs the question
of the meaning of that term. But public rights to access, passage
along the shore, boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and perhaps
even to the enjoyment of view, may well turn on this definition. And
a finding that a lake is navigable may extend the rights of navigation
and passage of a riparian owner while curtailing his rights to wharf
and fill and to exclude others from the shore between the high-
water and low-water marks. A number of Florida lake cases point
the way toward a broad definition which would include use for recre-
ational boating. And the commercial value of tourism to the state
might well influence the Court to find pleasure boating a commercial
use in Florida.
But Florida has taken the position that the state holds title to
the lands under navigable waters in "trust" and cannot dispose of
major portions of the beds. Adoption of a liberal definition of
navigability, without more, and its application to Florida's non-
meandered lakes, would therefore have the effect of upsetting con-
veyances of long standing from the state. The recent case of Adams
v. Crews3 75 has been criticized on this basis, and the establishment of
navigability on a lake-by-lake basis by litigation of this sort will be
both costly and uncertain.
There are other ways in which some of Florida's larger non-
meandered lakes can legally be made available for public use. Work-
ing through the concept of navigability, Florida's courts or her legis-
lature could differentiate between federally navigable lakes, including
the meandered lakes that have traditionally been placed in this
category and those that are navigable under a state though not the
federal definition. The trust doctrine could continue to be applied
to the former, while the state-recognized navigability of the latter
could be the basis for recognition of an easement for navigation
without invalidating earlier conveyances. This approach would be
consistent with the civil law rule originally applicable in Florida,
and it has been judicially approved in Oregon.76
375105 So.2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
376Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
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An alternative might be legislation similar to that found in
Louisiana,3 77 which prohibits attacks on titles to previously con-
veyed lands under navigable waters. The legislation could be coupled
with a broadening of the definition of navigability to encompass
recreational navigation, thus extending recognition of the right of
public navigation to many of Florida's non-meandered lakes. But the
fact that other public recreational uses, such as bathing and fishing,
might not be available unless dearly spelled out by the legislature
injects a note of caution with respect to possible use of this approach.
One problem inherent in any reappraisal of the navigability of
Florida's lakes is where to redraw the line if the old meander lines are
not to set the boundaries of public use. Certainly it would be un-
realistic and inappropriate to suggest that every pond that could
float a rowboat be declared navigable and open to the public.378 One
possible guideline might be the legislative declaration of state owner-
ship of fish in lakes exceeding 150 acres.3 7 9 It has been estimated that
approximately 950 of Florida's lakes exceed this size,380 whereas no
more than 190 were meandered in the original surveys. If this size
is thought inappropriate, the legislature in broadening the definition
of navigability could after appropriate study declare a size below
which the statutory definition would not be applicable and public
rights of use would not inhere.
In addition to the above suggestions, there is the possibility that
some non-navigable lakes might be made available to the public
through recognition of an easement for public use when a lake has
been stocked by the state and open to the public for a period of
years. Florida has now adopted the civil law rule permitting owners
of a part of a non-navigable lake to use the entire lake.381 Members
of the public may be able to gain access by invitation of an owner of
part of the lake. Finally, it may be practicable through the granting
of special tax benefits to encourage riparians to permit use of their
lands for public access to more of Florida's lakes.
377LA. REV. STAT. §9:5661 (1951), discussed in text following note 74 supra.
37BThe Wisconsin approach is apparently almost this extreme. See Shepard
Drainage Dist. v. Emmerman, 140 Wis. 327, 122 N.V. 755 (1908), declaring a mill-
pond to be navigable and open to the public.
379FLA. STAT. §370.10(1) (1950), found in the chapter on salt water fisheries
and discussed in Part III supra.
38olnterview with Ney C. Landrum of W. Turner Wallace and Associates,
Water Resources Consultants, at the Governor's Fresh Water Lakes Conference,
Tallahassee, Fla., Mar. 16, 1960.
aSiDuval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
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At this moment it is not certain which, if any, of these suggestions
for protecting the public interest may prove feasible. But one thing
does seem certain. With the increasing pressure to develop and
conserve more of Florida's fresh-water lakes for public use, steps will
be taken to bring about a more equitable harmonizing of the public
interest with the property rights of private owners. And, as pointed
out by Florida's Governor at a recent fresh-water lakes conference,
"moderate improvements in policy and administration now will fore-
stall the necessity for more drastic programs of government control
later."
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Little Lake Sampson (Little
Sampson Pond, Rosby)
Little Sante Fe (Hampton,
Santa Fe Pond)
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Polk 28, 29 S
Palm Beach 43 S
Polk 27, 28 S
Osceola 30 S
Polk 27, 28 S
Highlands 37 S
Polk 19 S
Jefferson, Leon 2, 3 N
Polk 28 S
Putnam 21 S
Lake 22, 23 S
Lake 22 S











Jackson 3, 4 N
Glades, Palm Beach 37-43 S
Orange 20 S
Alachua, Marion,
Putnam 11, 12 S
Putnam 9 S
Palm Beach 44, 45 S
Walton 3 S
Sumter 19, 20 S




Orange, Volusia 22 S
Orange, Volusia 22 S
Polk 28, 29 S
Highlands 27 S
Orange, Brevard,









































































Santa Fe Pond (Hampton,
Little Santa Fe)
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APPENDIX (Continued)
MEANDERED FLORIDA LAKES*
Lake County Township Range
Vigo Highlands 33 S 28 E
Wales Polk 20 S 27, 28 E
Walk-in-the Water (We-oh-
kapka) Polk 31, 32 S 29 E
Wall Putnam 9 S 23 E
Washington Brevard 26, 27 S 35 E
Webster Palm Beach 45 S 43 E
We-ho-ya-kapka (Walk-in-
the-Water) Polk 31, 32 S 29 E
Weir Marion 17 S 23, 24 E
Wimico Gulf 7 & 8 S 9 W
Winder Brevard 25, 26 S 35 E
Winterset Polk 29 S 26 E
Yale Lake 18 S 25, 26 E
UNNAMED LAKES
1 in Secs. 13, 24 Lake 18, 29 S 26, 27 E
1 in Secs. 24, 25 Lake 19 S 26 E
and Secs, 18, 19 Lake 18 S 27 E
1 in Sec. 27 Putnam 9 S 24 E
3 in Sec. 21 Putnam 9 S 24 E
1 in Sec. 16 (5 meandered as
I lake) Putnam 9 S 24 E
1 in Secs. 20, 29 Volusia 15 S 30 E
1 in Sees. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 Volusia 15 S 30 E
I in Sec. 19, 20 Volusia 15 S 30 E
and Sec. 24 Volusia 15 S 29 E
*This alphabetical list of meandered Florida lakes was made available to the
authors through the courtesy of the office of the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Fund.
